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5SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AC alternating current
ACK acknowledgement
AMBA advanced microcontroller bus architecture
API application programmer interface
ARM advanced RISC machines
ARQ automatic repeat request
ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
AXI advanced extensible interface
BCC block check character
CAN controller area network
CLB configurable logic block
CPU central processing unit
CRC cyclic redundancy check
DC direct current
FEC forward error correction
HARQ hybrid automatic repeat request
HDL hardware description language
HTML hypertext markup language
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IGBT insulated-gate bipolar transistor
I/O input/output
IP internet protocol, intellectual property
IP/UDP user datagram protocol over internet protocol
IPv4 internet protocol, version 4
JTAG joint test action group
6LCD liquid-crystal display
LRC longitudinal redundancy check
LSB least significant bit or byte
MSB most significant bit or byte
NAK negative acknowledgement
NRZ, NRZ-I no-return to zero, no-return to zero inverted
OSI open systems interconnection
PC personal computer
PCB protocol control block
PL programmable logic
PS programmable system
PWM pulse-width modulation
RF robot framework
RZ return to zero
SDK software development kit
SoC system on a chip
TCP transmission control protocol
UDP user datagram protocol
URL uniform resource locator
USB universal serial bus
VRC vertical redundancy check
XML extensible markup language
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Taajuusmuuttajia käytetään teollisuudessa laajasti,  sillä merkittävän osan teollisuuden 
sähkönkulutuksesta  muodostavat  oikosulkumoottorit,  joita  ajetaan  taajuusmuuttajien 
avulla.  Taajuusmuuttajiin  on mahdollista  kytkeä optiokortteja,  jotka lisäävät  taajuus-
muuttajaan valvonta-, ohjaus- ym. toiminnallisuuksia. Nämä kortit kommunikoivat sar-
jaliikenneväylän kautta taajuusmuuttajan pääyksikön kanssa.
Sarjaliikennelinkissä, kuten taajuusmuuttajan väylällä, voi syntyä virheitä, jotka häirit-
sevät tietoliikennettä. Sen takia sarjaliikenneprotokolliin on luotu virheentunnistus- ja -
korjausmekanismeja, joilla pyritään varmistamaan virheetön tiedon kuljettaminen. Luo-
tettavuutta testaamaan voidaan väylälle generoida virheitä siihen tarkoitetulla laitteella.
Tässä diplomityössä luotiin taajuusmuuttajia valmistavan yrityksen, Danfoss Drivesin 
(aik. Vacon), pyynnöstä häiriögeneraattorijärjestelmä. Järjestelmä koostuu SoC-FPGA-
piirillä luodusta virheitä syöttävästä laitteesta, PC-työkalulle luodusta testirajapinnasta 
sekä Ethernet-kommunikaatiosta niiden välillä. Laite kytketään väylään, ja testirajapinta 
tekee testaajalle mahdolliseksi luoda mukautettavia testejä ja ajaa testejä käyttäen Robot 
Framework -testiympäristöä.
Diplomityössä tutkittiin ensin sarjakommunikointiväylien yleisimpiä virheentunnistus- 
ja  korjauskeinoja  sekä  SoC-FPGA-piirien  sekä  työssä  käytetyn  Robot  Frameworkin 
ominaisuuksia.  Järjestelmä suunniteltiin  ylhäältä-alas-periaatteella  ensin tunnistamalla 
kolmen edellä mainitun komponentin päärakenne päätyen lopulta yksittäisten ohjelma-
funktioiden logiikan suunnitteluun. Tämän jälkeen laite ja testirajapinta toteutettiin C- ja 
Python-ohjelmointikielillä käyttäen suunnitellun kaltaista kommunikaatiota näiden kah-
den komponentin välillä.
Lopulta järjestelmä testattiin kaikki komponentit yhteen kytkettynä. Varsinainen injek-
torilogiikka, joka luo virheitä väylään, ei ollut työn loppuun mennessä vielä toimittavan 
tahon puolelta valmis, joten järjestelmää ei voitu testata todellisessa ympäristössä. Työs-
sä luodut osuudet voidaan kuitenkin myöhemmin kytkeä kokonaiseen järjestelmään.
Työn tärkeimpänä johtopäätöksenä  on,  että  tavoitteiden mukainen järjestelmä saatiin 
luotua ja testattua toimivaksi mahdollisin osin. Jatkokehityskohteeksi jäi mm. kokonai-
sen järjestelmän luonti ja testaus oikeaan kommunikaatioväylään kytkettynä.
AVAINSANAT: sarjaliikenne, virheentunnistus ja -korjaus, virheinjektointi, häiriöiden 
generointi
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ABSTRACT
Frequency converters are widely used in industry because a notable part of the industrial 
electricity consumption is by electrical induction motors driven by frequency convert-
ers. It is possible to connect option boards into a frequency converter to add monitoring 
and control features. These option boards communicate with the main control unit of the 
frequency converter over a serial communication link.
In a serial communication link, e.g. in a frequency converter, it can occur faults that in-
terfere with the transfer. Hence, error handling mechanisms are used to secure transmis-
sion of the data without errors. A fault injector device, which generates errors into the 
data travelling in the link, can be used to test the communication reliability.
In this master’s thesis, an error generator system was created for a company, Danfoss 
Drives (previously Vacon), manufacturing frequency converters. The system consists of 
a fault injector device created with a SoC-FPGA, a testing interface for a PC tool, and 
an Ethernet-based communication  between these two.  The device  is  connected  to  a 
serial communication link, and the testing interface makes it easy for a tester to create 
and run modifiable fault injection tests using a Robot Framework test environment.
At the beginning of the thesis, the most common error detection and correction mechan-
isms in serial  communication  and properties  of SoC-FPGAs, and Robot  Framework 
were studied. Following this, the system was designed with top-down approach, first 
identifying the main structure of the components, and finally ending up in designing the 
logic of individual functions. After this, the device and the testing interface were imple-
mented in C and Python using the designed Ethernet communication between them.
After the implementation, the system was tested with all the components combined. The 
actual fault injection logic was not ready by the end of the thesis, so the tests were not 
run in a real environment. However, the work is done so that the implemented parts can 
be later used in a complete system.
The most important conclusion is that the system was created and tested to meet the re-
quirements with applicable parts. Further development includes creating a complete sys-
tem and testing it with a real communication link.
KEYWORDS: serial communication, error detection and correction, fault injection, er-
ror generation
91 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Frequency converters
This master’s thesis is done for Danfoss Drives which is a manufacturer of frequency 
converters. Frequency converters have an important role in industry, because a signific-
ant share, two thirds of the electrical energy in industry is consumed by electrical mo-
tors in industrial  applications (Motiva 2006: 14). These motors are mostly induction 
motors driven by alternating current (AC) from the power grid with a frequency con-
verter. The operation speed and torque of an induction motor depend on the voltage and 
the frequency of the input AC current. Thus, to control the motor, a frequency converter 
is used to convert the fixed-voltage and frequency AC current from the power grid for 
the motor energy-efficiently.
1.1.1 Working principle of a frequency converter
A frequency converter is used to control the torque and the speed of an electric motor by 
adjusting the motor input frequency and voltage. It draws alternating current from the 
power grid and converts it into alternating current that has a desired voltage and fre-
quency. Typically, the generated sinusoidal AC current is fed into an electric motor. 
This alternating current generates rotating magnetic fields which eventually rotate the 
rotor of the electric motor. (Krishnan 2001: 313).
The power conversion part of a frequency converter consist of a rectifier, an inverter 
and a direct current (DC) link circuit between them. This is depicted in Figure 1. The 
electric power fed to the variable-frequency drive is normally alternating current with 
three phases (L1, L2 and L3 in Fig. 1). This alternating current is converted into a DC 
voltage by using a rectifier which can consist of a diode bridge or thyristors. This DC 
link is an intermediate circuit between the AC input and the AC output and it holds a 
DC voltage. Usually, the DC link circuit contains capacitors that reduce ripple in the DC 
voltage and thus try to keep the level of the DC link voltage constant. (Krishnan 2001: 
314–315).
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Figure 1. The main parts of the power conversion part of a variable-frequency drive. 
(Hindmarsh & Renfrew 1996: 259).
The DC voltage provided by the DC link is then converted by an inverter into alternat-
ing current. The inverting is done by the inverter (on the right in Figure 1) that chops 
the DC link voltage with semiconductor  switches,  usually IGBTs (insulated-gate bi-
polar transistor). These semiconductor switches connect the output of a phase to either 
the negative or to the positive bus of the DC link (Fisher 1991: 409).  The pulse-width 
modulation (PWM) of the variable-frequency drive controls the length of the pulses so 
that sinusoidal alternating currents are formed at the three-phase output (U, V and W in 
Fig. 1), which are needed to operate a rotating electric motor (IEEE 1997: 210–216).
1.1.2 Control circuit and option boards of a frequency converter
In addition to the previously described power conversion part, depicted in Fig. 1, the 
variable-frequency drive also has a control unit (control circuit) that drives the logic of 
the device. It controls the inverting circuit by switching on and off the semiconductor 
switches to produce the desired waveform for the output. The control unit is also re-
sponsible of receiving inputs such as adjustments in speed or torque or to stop or start 
the motor, and to react to them accordingly.  The main parts of a control unit are shown 
in Fig. 2. (Danfoss 2000: 52).
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Figure 2. Main parts of a variable-frequency drive, including the power conversion 
part (rectifier, DC link and inverter) and the control circuit. (Danfoss 2000: 
52). 
The control unit communicates also with the user interface logic. The user of the drive 
can perform the operations by a physical operator panel on the front side of the variable-
frequency drive, shown in Figure 3, or by a personal computer (PC).
Figure 3. The operator panel of a Vacon NXP frequency converter with an LCD (li-
quid crystal display) and a keypad.
In addition to this, the control unit handles other digital and analogue inputs or outputs 
which may be connected to an option board that performs a special task. These exten-
sions can be inserted into the existing slots inside the variable-frequency drive to add 
functionality without replacing the variable frequency drive or its control unit. The op-
tion boards can be designed to handle some special operation and communicate with the 
drive itself. (Danfoss 2016: 4–5).
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Option boards can be connected into a variable-frequency drive to easily add functional-
ity. Each card has a dedicated functionality, and they communicate with the control unit 
of the drive through a serial communication link. This communication between the op-
tion boards and the control unit must be robust to ensure that the functionality works as 
intended, which is critical especially in safety-critical applications. Thus, serial commu-
nication links need to make sure that instructions are passed between the components 
without errors.
The robustness of the communication is a vital part of the functionality of a variable-fre-
quency drive.  Therefore,  verifying  how the  error  handling  in  the  communication  is 
working, cannot be overlooked. To improve testing process effectiveness and the cover-
age of the tests, proper development procedures such as test-driven development and 
different testing frameworks can be utilised.
1.2 Objective
The objective of this thesis is to create a system generating errors, an error generator  
system, depicted in Fig. 4. Its task is to inject faults into a serial communication link to 
test the reliability of the communication. The created error generator system is used in 
the test automation system of Danfoss. The system consists of the components that are 
depicted in Figure 4:
1. A fault  injector,  that  is  an SoC-FPGA (system-on-a-chip field-programmable  
gate array). It generates and injects errors into a communication link connected 
to it. 
2. Test library, which provides an interface for a tester to create and run tests with 
a personal computer (PC) by using the fault injector. It consists of fault injection 
functions (“keywords”) that can be called, and test templates. The test library 
communicates with the fault injector over Ethernet.
3. A high-speed communication link and the nodes communicating over the link. 
The fault injector is connected to the link, and the tests that are generated and 
run with the testing library should generate errors in the data in the link.
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Figure 4. The initial schematic of the error generator system that is designed and im-
plemented in this thesis.
The objective of this thesis is divided into three parts:
1. Designing and implementing the  Robot Framework  test library (Robot Frame-
work is discussed in detail in Subchapter 2.5).
2. Creating the design for the programmable system (the processor) of the SoC-
FPGA fault injector. Firstly, it communicates over Ethernet with the test library, 
as well as with an AXI (Advanced eXtensible Interface) protocol with a fault in-
jection logic block.
3. Designing the communication between the test library and the SoC-FPGA fault 
injector over Ethernet.
The fault injection logic block is an intellectual property (IP) FPGA block, that is imple-
mented on the same SoC-FPGA as the fault injector. It does the actual error generating 
and injection on the communication link, that is connected to the SoC-FPGA. However, 
the fault injection logic block is designed by Danfoss, and thus it is supplied later for the 
thesis and designing it is not included in the objective. Also, the high-speed communic-
ation link, the nodes on the link and the data transferred in the link are not included in 
the objective of this thesis. The communication link and the fault injection logic block 
are shortly discussed more in Subchapters 3.2. and 3.3.
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1.3 Structure
The structure of this thesis consists roughly of three larger parts: the theory, the design 
and implementation and the testing part. In the theory part, essential theory is studied to 
provide the possibility to continue with the implementation and especially the testing 
part where the results are reflected with the presented theory. The implementation part 
describes the creation process of the system, and finally, testing part lists and analyses 
the test results and other observations made while demonstrating the device.
A significant part of Chapter 2 concentrates on research of the serial communication 
protocols. They are studied focusing on error detection and error handling techniques. 
Since the underlying communication bus protocol is implemented by the company, its 
implementation details are not shared. However, the error handling mechanisms of two 
other protocols are shortly described to give reference. SoC-FPGAs and the Ethernet 
communication possibilities are also studied with some extent to give base and helpful 
reference for the design and implementation phase. Finally, the test framework, Robot  
Framework, is introduced, focusing on what can be achieved with it.
The design and implementation phase starts with the more detailed description of the 
structure of the error generator system. All the parts of the error generator system that 
are created (the SoC-FPGA fault  injector,  the Robot Framework test  library and the 
communication between them) are described, including how the system is integrated as 
a part of Danfoss test automation system. After this, both the hardware part on the SoC-
FPGA and the testing library with Robot Framework are designed. Finally, the design is 
implemented and the implementation details are given.
Chapter 6 includes the planning of tests, the description of the test environment as well 
as the test results. The test results are analysed and summarised at the end of the chapter 
by using reflection from the theory and the objective parts of the thesis. Finally, the pre-
vious parts are wrapped up with conclusions and a summary.
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2 FAULT INJECTION
In this chapter, required theory is studied to give reference and help for the work in the 
design and implementation phase as well as the testing for the error generator system. 
The study tries to flow logically from the communication link, where the errors are gen-
erated and injected, to the software where the tests are eventually run, opening all the 
relative theory needed in between.
First, we start by introducing the serial communication basics and their error detection 
techniques  to understand what  is  happening inside the error generator  system. Then 
some research is done on fault injection in general as well as faults in digital communic-
ation to grasp consequences of faults and what benefits can be achieved by using fault 
injection in testing and increasing robustness of a system against those faults.
After  this  research,  which is  carried out in rather a lecture-like form, the remaining 
study focuses on the practical part of this thesis. Study is done on how the hardware of 
the SoC-FPGA fault injector works and how it communicates with other components in 
the error  generator  system.  Ultimately,  introduction  of  a  test  automation  framework 
“Robot Framework” which is used in the thesis for the test library, is given.
2.1 Serial communication
Serial communication in general consists of sending data in serial rather than in parallel. 
In other words, in a serial communication, a sender sends, and a receiver receives one 
bit after another instead of multiple bits at the same time (Axelson 2007: 11). To under-
stand the effects of fault injection into a serial communication link, the basics of serial 
communication are studied.
In this subchapter, the focus is on the physical layer and the data link layer, the two bot-
tom-most layers, of the OSI (open systems interconnection) model. OSI model is a con-
ceptual model defined by an ISO (International Organization for Standardization) stand-
ard. According to the model, communication is built on layers, each of which provides 
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defines functionality for the layer above, by encapsulating the functionality from the 
layer below (ISO 2002).
2.1.1 Serial versus parallel communication
Serial communication is used very widely in different applications, mainly due to its 
more efficient usage of the data transfer medium than parallel communication methods. 
When a serial communication is used, in the most optimal situation only two wires (one 
for the data and one for ground) can be used to transfer the data when an electrical 
transfer medium is used. There might also be a clock signal if the communication is 
synchronous.  A serial  communication  without  a  clock signal  is  called  asynchronous 
communication. (Dell 2015: 90).
In a parallel  communication,  more wires are needed to send the data.  For example, 
sending an eight-bit byte requires at least eight parallel data wires and a ground wire. In 
general, parallel communications are easy to implement and in addition, because more 
data can be sent over a parallel communication during the same time, they are usually 
faster than serial  communications.  This is  also a  drawback, because it  increases  the 
manufacturing costs of the cables and the connectors and using more signal paths in an 
integrated circuit reduces the available space in the circuit. Furthermore, due to the large 
number of conductors, there is more interference and crosstalk in parallel communica-
tion than in a serial link. Also, because of this, the transfer distance is limited which is 
why serial communications are mostly preferred and used especially when data is sent 
over longer distances, e.g.  from one circuit  to another using a cable.  (Murthy 2009: 
119–120).
2.1.2 Synchronous and asynchronous serial communication
In a serial communication – or in digital communication in general – it is vital that the 
receiver and the transmitter of the data are synchronised, meaning that the received data 
from the transmitter is sampled at the correct interval at the receiver. If the parties were 
not synchronised, there would not be a way to determine, where the data would start and 
end, resulting into corrupted data and inability for the parties to communicate. These 
synchronisation errors in critical  applications,  such as in a variable-frequency motor 
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drive, could lead to fatal consequences. Thus, here, a comparison of synchronisation 
methods is done to grasp how the synchronisation can be carried out and what are their 
effects on both the communication robustness and transfer speed (Dell 2015: 90).
As shown in Figure 5, the synchronisation can be carried out in a protocol by a separate 
clock signal or by adding information in the data to provide the receiver the possibility 
for synchronisation. 
Figure 5. An illustration by Axelson (2007: 13) on how synchronous serial commu-
nication  requires  a  separate  line  for  the  clock,  whereas  an  asynchronous 
transmission needs synchronisation bits (here a start bit and a stop bit) to 
synchronise the data.
In a  synchronous transfer, a clock signal is transferred alongside with the sent data. 
This pulsating clock signal states the beginning of each data bit which synchronises the 
communication. With this setup, high speed rates can be achieved. The drawback is that 
transferring the clock signal requires an additional wire and the protocol must define 
who the master is, i.e. which party of the communication is responsible of generating 
the clock signal. (Murthy 2009: 122).
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In  asynchronous communication, however, no clock signal is being transferred. The 
transmitter and the receiver must agree beforehand on the speed of the communication, 
e.g. by a definition in the standard or by configuring the parties. Despite this, because of 
inaccuracy, the clocks of the receiver and the transmitter may and will probably not be 
exactly the same. Therefore, by sending synchronisation bits at the beginning of each 
data packet (a transfer unit of data consisting of bits), the receiver can both acknow-
ledge when the actual data starts and synchronise the clock if any skew has occurred in 
relation to that of the transmitter. This way with asynchronous communication, one wire 
for the clock can be saved, as well as the configuration for the clock master. On the 
other hand, extra data must be sent in form of synchronisation bits which increases the 
overhead. Furthermore, another drawback is the clock skew which limits the maximum 
speed of the communication. (Axelson 2007: 11–12).
2.2 Error control in digital communication
In this thesis, an error generator system is created to test the tolerance of the communic-
ation link against faults. With a proper error detection and handling in this serial com-
munication protocol, number of errors can be decreased.
As stated, the system that is created, tries to simulate real-life faults and errors by inten-
tionally generating and injecting them into the communication link to test robustness. 
These real-life faults and errors in digital  communication can be caused by multiple 
factors “in the field”. As stated in Subchapter 2.1.2, inaccurate or flawed clocks can per-
turb the communication if  synchronisation is  not implemented properly.  In addition, 
outside factors such as interference and disturbance in the actual transfer medium are 
simple reasons for an error. Furthermore, the limited capacity of a communication link 
can cause errors if congestion in the communication occurs. The causes of faults are dis-
cussed in more detail and listed in Subchapter 2.2.1.
In general,  error control against these faults in any protocol consists roughly of two 
parts: managing how the receiving end should detect an error in the message (error de-
tection) and the operations to ensure that the correct message can be delivered to the re-
cipient by the protocol should there be an error (error handling). To comprehend the 
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fault management in the communication link, different error detection and correction 
mechanisms are studied and compared in Subchapters 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 to provide base 
for reflection in the eventual testing phase.
2.2.1 Types and causes of errors in digital communication
As stated earlier, the error generator system simulates real-life faults on a serial link. 
These errors can occur in several ways. Firstly, through the electromagnetic interference 
(EMI), disturbing currents can be induced in the electric transmission link, modifying 
the digital signal travelling in it. The electric transfer medium can either absorb electro-
magnetic interference from other electric devices that are sources of electromagnetic 
fields, or it can be interfered with by another nearby communication wire, also known 
as  crosstalk  (Malarić 2010: 69–75). The interference can come from a natural source, 
too. A lightning strike or electrostatic discharges are typical examples of this (Malarić 
2010: 59).
Secondly, all electrical signals contain some amount of noise. It is a random disturbance 
in a signal, and it is caused by e.g. the thermal motion of the electrons (thermal noise) as 
well as the randomness in their movement (shot noise). Usually, the noise level is low 
but if the relative amplitude of the noise in a signal rises too high compared with the ac-
tual data signal, the information in the signal cannot be distinguished from the noise. 
(Malarić 2010: 58).
Furthermore,  as  already stated  in  Subchapter  2.1.2,  the  lack  of  synchronisation  can 
cause errors, too. If the communication protocol does not define enough means of re-
synchronisation of the transmitter and the receiver by for instance a clock signal or a 
self-clocking line coding, clock skew can occur, meaning that the receiver samples the 
signal at an erroneous point, which can possibly lead to a faulty bit value read by the re-
ceiver. Synchronisation errors can occur even if there were no interference or disturb-
ance with the  travelling in the communication link.
Errors in the digital  communication are realised as flipped bits. This means that the 
transmitter intended to send a bit but because of an error in the signal, the receiver reads 
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the value of the bit flipped, so that the value of the bit is of opposite polarity. Single and 
multiple bit errors are shown in Fig. 6.
Figure 6. Single bit errors and multiple bit errors.
If only one bit in the data packet changes, a single bit error occurs. However, in the 
serial communication protocols, the duration to transfer a single bit is very small. There-
fore, it is very unlikely that only a single bit is flipped because of an error, so single bit  
errors are relatively rare in serial communication.
Thus, it is more likely that multiple bits are flipped because of a fault. This is because 
the erroneous state in the communication link usually lasts for a relatively long time 
compared to the transfer speed. This is called a burst error. Multiple bits – which do not 
necessarily have to be consecutive – are flipped, causing incorrect data. If the erroneous 
state lasts very long, the whole packet can be corrupted by flipped bits, causing that the 
other end will never receive the packet, resulting in a lost packet.
Furthermore, if the communication protocol uses automatic repeat request, ARQ (dis-
cussed later in Subchapter 2.2.3), the receiver must send information to the transmitter 
that it had received the data. If an error occurs while sending this acknowledgement, the 
transmitter would try to resend the same data. In this case, a duplicate packet error takes 
place, because the given packet has already been sent.
Data packets can be lost because of an error or they can intentionally be dropped, lead-
ing into dropped packets. This can happen if there is too much traffic on the communic-
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ation link. If too many packets would be sent into the communication link, the transmit-
ter has to drop some of the packets to avoid traffic congestion in the communication 
link.
2.2.2 Detecting errors in transmitted data
Detecting errors in communication protocols is based on sending data with inserted ad-
ditional or redundant information that can be used to validate data integrity at the re-
ceiving end. In a very simple example, the protocol can define a following error correc-
tion mechanism: If the sender sends four bits, e.g. 0110, it should add those four bits re-
peated as a data validation field, thus sending 8 bits (0110 0110). So, if the protocol is 
followed, when the receiver receives anything different than a packet that consists of 
two exactly same four-bit bytes, it will detect an error and the communication will begin 
a procedure to handle the error. The principle is simple. However, because the given ex-
ample would be very slow and ineffective, much more accurate and effective algorithms 
are used in practice to calculate the additional error detection field, some the most com-
mon of which are presented next.
Parity is a simple way to check that the data is transmitted immutably. Parity check is 
used to validate data in a byte level by adding a parity bit at the end of the actual data 
bits. Thus, if a byte contains an even number of 1’s, the parity bit should be zero. Con-
versely, if the number of 1’s in the byte is odd, the parity bit is set to one. This is called 
even parity, since an even number of 1’s produces a 0 parity bit.  Hence,  odd parity 
would mean that the value of the parity bit is inverted. By checking if the number of 1’s  
in the data byte is the same as stated by the parity bit, an error can be detected. How-
ever, if an error caused an even number of changes in the data bits, the error would go 
undetected. For example, noise bursts usually cause disintegration to more than only 
one bit, which is why parity is not very reliable form of detecting errors. (Hioki 2001: 
519–522).
Previously mentioned way of calculating parity is usually referred as vertical redund-
ancy check (VRC) because the parity bit is calculated for each byte. Parity bits can be 
computed also at the end of the block of a multiple-byte-message, which is called lon-
gitudinal redundancy check (LRC). The parity is computed for each bit position from 
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LSB (least significant bit) to MSB (most significant bit) and the possible VRC bit. With 
the combination of VRC and LRC, the position of the erroneous bit can be found and 
corrected unlike if only vertical parity was applied. However, like in vertical redund-
ancy check, an even number of errors in the bits cannot be found. (Hioki 2001: 522).  
Table 1 gives an example how the LRC and VRC are calculated for a multiple word 
message.
Table 1. A message consisting of four 4-bit data words. Each data word has in addi-
tion a parity bit calculated with vertical redundancy check. A parity calcula-
tion is then applied to each bit position (from bit 0 to VRC) into the LRC 
column. Here, even parity is applied.
Word 1 Word 2 Word 3 Word 4 LRC
bit 0 0 1 1 0 0
bit 1 1 1 0 1 1
bit 2 0 1 0 1 0
bit 3 1 0 0 1 0
VRC 0 1 1 1 1
Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is a more effective way to detect errors. In the CRC, 
the message block is divided by a generator polynomial and the remainder of the divi-
sion, a  block check character (BCC), is appended at  the end of the message block, 
which is depicted in Fig. 7. The receiver then checks the integrity of the data by divid-
ing the message block containing the block check character by the same generator poly-
nomial:  expected  remainder  of  the  division  should  be  0 if  the  data  was transferred 
without any errors detected. (Peterson & Brown 1961: 228–235).
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Figure 7. An example  of  creating  the  BCC using CRC according to  Hioki  (2001: 
526).  Here,  the  divisor  is  the  generator  polynomial  X5 +  X2 +  X +  1  = 
100111 and the dividend is the actual data 101001101 with 5 trailing zeroes. 
The number of zeros added defines the length of the BCC.
Because CRC is more efficient than the vertical and longitudinal redundancy checks and 
still does not increase the implementation costs significantly, it is used widely as the 
main error detection mechanism in many serial communication protocols. (Hioki 2001: 
524–525).
Checksums are another popular way to detect errors. As the name implies, the bytes in 
the data are added up and the sum is appended at the end of the actual message as the 
block check character (BCC). Depending on the length of the BCC, the checksum can 
be a single-precision checksum or a double-precision checksum. Here, any overflow or 
carry is ignored; the accuracy of the error detection can be increased by using either the 
residue checksum where the overflown value is added back to the checksum or the Hon-
eywell checksum where the checksum is calculated by summing up the bits of two con-
secutive data words instead of one. (Hioki 2001: 529–531).
Cyclic redundancy check is a very common fault detection mechanism, thanks to its 
high error detection rate. For example, universal serial bus (USB) which is a popular 
serial communication protocol commonly used to connect peripherals and other devices 
with a personal computer, uses CRC to detect corrupt packages. Another popular serial 
communication protocol, controller area network (CAN), which is used broadly in auto-
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motive industry, relies its error detection on CRC by, similarly to USB, appending a 
CRC field at the end of each data packet sent as shown in Fig. 8. (Compaq & al. 2000: 
1999 , Bosch 1991: 59).
Figure 8. CAN frame format showing the CRC and ACK fields that are vital for error 
management  (Davis & al. 2007: 245).
2.2.3 Error correction in a communication link
After an error is detected, the protocol should handle how to manage it. There are two 
basic types of correcting the errors in  the communication;  automatic  repeat  request 
(ARQ) and forward error correction  (FEC). In ARQ, the receiver must automatically 
send a response to the sender acknowledging that the received data is transmitted cor-
rectly. If the receiver detects an error by using an error detection mechanism, e.g. a 
CRC, it should respond the transmitter negatively or not at all so that the transmitter 
may try to send the data again (Hioki 2001: 532). The example of a sequence of frames 
sent with an ARQ is shown in Fig. 9.
Figure 9. The sender sends three data frames (F1, F2, F3) with an ARQ protocol. The 
receiver detects an error in frame F2 and sends a negative acknowledgement 
(NAK) to force the sender to resend the frame.
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In FEC, however, the sent data includes a correction code which injects redundant bits 
in the data. The receiver can decode the correction code then to both detect the error and 
to correct the error (Hioki 2001: 532). This decreases the need to retransmit the data if 
an error occurs, which is why FEC is preferred in communications where resending the 
data would be too expensive or not possible. An example of a FEC mechanism is a very 
widely used hamming code (Hamming 1950) but the implementation details will not be 
presented here.
One of the previous two can be applied for a protocol. In addition, a combination of 
these two can be used to both request a retransmission and correcting errors by a code. 
This is called hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ). In HARQ, in a simplified man-
ner, the receiver tries to correct errors with the error correction code. If there are too 
many errors, an automatic repeat request is sent. (Wicker 1995: 409).
Another possibility is  blind transmission, or  unacknowledged connectionless transfer, 
where  neither  positive  or  negative  acknowledgement  is  returned  to  the  transmitter. 
Hence,  the  transmitter  cannot  be  sure  whether  the  transmission  was  error-free  or 
whether the data ever received its destination. Even though data transmission cannot be 
re-requested, data with faults are ignored (“dropped”) by the receiver e.g. with the CRC, 
so that only correct data will be handled. (Shinde 2000: 171).
The obvious drawback of blind transmission is the uncertainty in the transmission, but 
not acknowledging the data reduces the bandwidth usage of the communication link and 
increases speed, when there is no acknowledgement and retransmission. The method is 
useful, when the bandwidth is limited, acknowledgement is not necessary or when there 
is no possibility to acknowledge (lack of return channel). To reduce the number of lost 
packets, the transmitter can send a packet multiple times and “hope” that at least one of 
them will receive the destination.
Table 2 shows the comparison of the error correction mechanisms studied here. As can 
be  seen,  all  the  correction  mechanisms  have  some advantages  but  also  drawbacks, 
meaning that the mechanism should be carefully selected to fit the application.
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Table 2. Error correction mechanisms in a nutshell.
Error cor-
rection 
mechanism
Basis of correction Advantages Drawbacks
ARQ Positive or negative response 
returned depending on the 
result of error detection
Data is sent reliably ACKs use band-
width and retrans-
missions cause 
delay
FEC Correction code included in 
data; receiver detects and 
corrects the error
No need to return 
acknowledgement
Additional correc-
tion code must be 
inserted into the 
message
HARQ Combination of ARQ and 
FEC
Best of both ARQ 
and FEC
Those of ARQ & 
FEC
Blind trans-
mission
Data with errors is dropped 
but no repeat request
Speed and low use 
of communication 
link. No additional 
codes.
Lost data cannot be 
recovered
The previously presented serial communication protocol examples, USB and CAN, both 
rely on ARQ as their error correction mechanism. In USB, the client should send an ac-
knowledgement packet (ACK) back to the host after each data packet that is sent, if no 
errors were detected. If the host does not receive an ACK packet within a certain time 
limit, a frame, it will assume that the transmission failed and will resend the same data 
packet. In CAN, however, because of its distributed nature, if none of the receiving 
devices detects that the transmission was error-free, an acknowledgement error occurs, 
and the sender will try to retransmit the packet. Furthermore, if a device detects an error, 
it  will  send an error  frame,  which corrupts the packet  that is  being transmitted and 
forces the sender to retransmit.
With the acknowledgement mechanism in the ARQ based error correction, the corrup-
ted packets in USB (or frames in CAN) that are detected by the CRC can be resent  
properly to the receiver.  Furthermore,  acknowledging each packet ensures protection 
against lost packets; if the packet is lost, the transmitter will not get an ACK response 
and is forced to resend the packet.
The ARQ must be extended to detect duplicate packets. In USB, for example, detecting 
a duplicate packet is implemented by data toggling, i.e. adding a packet identifier, that is 
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toggled between DATA0 and DATA1 for each sent data packet (Axelson 2015: 51–53). 
A duplicate packet would be detected by the USB device if the packet identifier did not 
change  between  consecutive  received  data  packets.  On the  other  hand,  because  the 
transmitter in a CAN bus doesn’t communicate directly with the receiver but – unlike in 
USB – it broadcasts the frame to all the receivers, managing duplicate packets is not 
done by the protocol itself but should be implemented by the receiving nodes.
2.3 Fault injection testing
In this thesis, an error generator system is created to test communication reliability with 
fault injection. In fault injection in general, a set of selected faults is injected into a sys-
tem. The system is then monitored to validate that the response of the system matches 
the defined specifications during faulty conditions. In this way, test coverage can be im-
proved when also more seldom error conditions can be tested, too.
According to Benso & Brinetto (2003: 28–30), the faults in a hardware system can be 
divided into three main categories:
• hardware faults caused by wearing out or breaking of a hardware component,
• intermittent (or periodic) faults because of the instability of the system, and
• transient faults from e.g. EMI and noise.
So, in our error generating system, it can be validated that the communication link (the 
system) manages the corrupted or lost packets (the injected faults) by detecting the er-
rors and starting the error management procedure defined in the protocol (responding 
by the definition). (Koren & Krishna 2007: 355, Benso & Brinetto 2003: 35).
The permanent faults are relatively infrequent and easy to detect, and the hardware sys-
tem can be recovered from them by repairing or replacing the component that causes the 
fault. Also, the system can be recovered from intermittent faults by either component re-
placement or redesigning the system if the intermittent fault is caused by a design error 
(a “bug”) (Benso & Brinetto 2003: 28–29).
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On the other hand, the transient faults are the most common faults and they are more 
difficult to detect than permanent or intermittent faults. Usually, the transient faults do 
not cause significant damage to the hardware system itself but rather leave the system 
into a faulty state for a short time which is likely to cause unexpected behaviour in the 
system. Thus, fault injection tests on hardware, e.g. on a communication link, should 
have their focus on the transient faults. (Benso & Brinetto 2003: 11–12).
It is possible to generate transient errors that resemble the effects of a real-life fault dir-
ectly in the hardware. However, direct hardware fault injection can damage the system 
and it is very device-specific and thus not a portable solution (Benso & Brinetto 2003: 
30–31). A more popular way is to connect a software-based fault injector device into the 
hardware system. The software in the fault injector manages changing the bits in the 
data, producing a fault with same effects as an actual physical fault (Koren & Krishna 
2007: 357). 
So, the SoC-FPGA fault injector in this thesis can be connected on the communication 
link between the parties. It manipulates the data sent by the transmitter before its trans-
mitted to the receiver, and so it injects a fault in the communication system that reminds 
of a real hardware fault, such as excessive electromagnetic interference on the commu-
nication link. With the error generator system, the following faults are able to be injec-
ted into the communication link with the use of the Robot Framework test library:
1. CRC fault: bits in the message data are flipped so that the CRC calculation is vi-
olated. CRC field is not modified.
2. Change target address: The message contains a “target address” field. Its con-
tents are manipulated so that the message is received by an undesired receiver.
3. Increasing/decreasing the length of the message.
4. Duplicate: The message is sent twice with the same contents.
5. Removing the message: The message is lost and thus not received.
The error detection and handling, and the contents of a message in the serial communic-
ation link in this thesis is discussed in more detail later, in Subchapter 3.2.
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2.4 SoC-FPGAs
As the fault injector device in this thesis, a field-programmable gate-array (FPGA) is 
used. It is a circuit that is field-programmable or reconfigurable by the designer. An 
FPGA can be programmed by designing and specifying the logic with a hardware de-
scription language (HDL). An FPGA consists of a high number of configurable logic  
blocks (CLBs) which usually implement a simple logical function or memory. When the 
FPGA is programmed, a configuration tool connects these multiple configurable logic 
cells of the FPGA together so that a circuit that implements the specified logic is cre-
ated. Thus, an FPGA can implement a logic of an application-specific integrated circuit 
(ASIC) but has the advantage of being reconfigurable which increases available devel-
opment time and reduces costs. (Shannon 2012: 127).
Because an FPGA does not contain any logic itself, designing the logic must be done 
from the beginning. Thanks to the possibility to fully customise the logic, FPGAs are 
faster in signal processing than a CPU (central processing unit) but because of the lack 
of  overhead  such  as  predefined  processor  instructions  and  peripherals  like  memory 
units, the development is very time consuming.
So, usually it is more reasonable in an application to use a microcontroller or a pro-
cessor where some of the more complex calculations are done, and use an FPGA where 
data processing that requires low latency and speed is needed. To create this kind of a 
system, a stand-alone CPU and an FPGA alongside with other peripherals can be used. 
A more economically sound choice is to use a soft core, i.e. to implement the CPU logic 
on the FPGA itself – since any logic, even a CPU can be programmed on an FPGA. One 
alternative is to use a SoC FPGA.
A SoC FPGA is a single integrated circuit that has a full processor architecture includ-
ing a central processing unit, memory and inputs and outputs (I/O) and other peripherals 
such as networking interfaces on a single chip. The chip is relatively small, so it can be 
used in applications where circuit size is limited, and low power consumption is needed. 
This processor is integrated with an FPGA onto a single chip to utilise the best parts of 
the both. The advantage of this is that, unlike in a system consisting of a separate micro-
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processor and an FPGA, the SoC FPGA is on a single silicon, decreasing the distance 
between the signals that are transmitted between the two, thus decreasing power con-
sumption, response time and manufacturing costs. (Altera 2013: 1–4).
2.4.1 Advanced eXtensible Interface
The Advanced eXtensible Interface (AXI) is an interface protocol defined in ARM (ad-
vanced RISC machines) advanced microcontroller bus architecture (AMBA) specifica-
tion. It is widely used protocol for developing applications for SoC-FPGAs. The AXI 
protocol defines the rules how the data is exchanged between intellectual property (IP) 
cores. (Xilinx 2012: 5).
Thus, the AXI protocol can, for instance, be used to set up the communication between 
the programmable system (PS), i.e. the microcontroller and the programmable logic, the 
FPGA. In the use case of the thesis, the programmable system can receive data over net-
work from the PC tool, process it, and write the processed data with AXI protocol to the 
fault injection logic block, which is an FPGA IP block. 
The communication with an AXI protocol starts with a handshake process during which 
the master of the AXI communication and the slave indicate that they both are ready for 
the data transmission. After a successful handshake, the data is transferred over the se-
lected channel, depending what kind of action is desired. There are five different chan-
nels: write address channel, write data channel, write response channel, read address 
channel and read data channel. All the channels have their own handshake channels, and 
the handshake is executed using the handshake channel of the corresponding action. For 
example, if the AXI master intends to read data from the AXI slave, the address is trans-
ferred over the read address channel, and the read data is transferred to the master with 
the read data channel, as shown in Fig. 10. (Xilinx 2012: 5–6).
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Figure 10. The read transaction uses the read address and the read data channels to read 
data (Xilinx 2012: 5).
Figure 11 illustrates the channels and the data used during a write transaction over the 
AXI protocol. For example, when the master requests to write data, a handshake is done 
on the  write address channel, after which the data, the address where the data write 
should occur, is sent by the master. After this, another handshake is executed on the 
write data channel, and the master sends the actual data which should be written to the 
address. Finally, the slave sends an acknowledgement for successful data write by using 
the write response channel.
Figure 11. Write channels (write address, write data & write response) in the AXI in-
terface and the flow during the write transaction (Xilinx 2012: 6).
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2.4.2 Internet protocol and user datagram protocol
The fault injector device which is implemented in the thesis, will communicate with the 
PC tool over Ethernet – this should not be confused with the serial communication link 
where the errors are generated. Thus, implementing the communication requires know-
ledge also on the protocols that are used to transfer data over Ethernet. On the transport 
layer, the user datagram protocol (UDP) is used together with the internet protocol (IP) 
underneath it on the internet layer and, as stated, Ethernet on the link layer. An alternat-
ive for UDP could be transmission control protocol (TCP).
The internet protocol is the protocol that takes responsibility to route the transferred 
data between the networks. The actual data is in a packet of a higher-level protocol 
(such as UDP or TCP) and when sending such a packet over the Internet Protocol, it is  
encapsulated in a IP packet. The IP packet adds additional headers into the data, such as 
IP address which is used to route the package into the correct network and to the correct 
recipient. Furthermore, the IP packet is wrapped into a frame in the link layer protocol 
(e.g. Ethernet) and this data is passed into the transfer medium. An example with the 
data encapsulation hierarchy (with UDP/IP) can be seen in Fig. 12. (RFC 791: 1–11).
Figure 12. Data encapsulation with UDP and IP.
Also, the Internet Protocol takes responsibility of fragmentation and reassembly of the 
data. This means that if the link layer below the IP layer has restricted length for the 
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frame it can transfer, the Internet Protocol will slice the data in smaller fragments to di-
vide it into several frames. Upon the receiving, the receiver will then reassembly the 
fragmented data. (RFC 791: 7–8).
With the UDP protocol, applications can send datagrams, i.e. data packets, over an IP 
network. As depicted in Fig. 13, a UDP datagram consists of a header field which has 
the destination address (IP address) for the datagram, the data length and optionally a 
source port and a checksum to validate the data. (RFC 768: 1). 
When the IP protocol is used, also a pseudo header is added before the UDP packet’s 
own header and it consists of the source and destination IP addresses as well as the pro-
tocol identifier and the packet length. This pseudo header has no functional meaning; 
the IP addresses here are not used to route the data, but they are only a part of the check-
sum calculation. (RFC 768: 2).
Figure 13. UDP datagram with IP (version 4, IPv4) pseudo header in green, the UDP 
datagram header  in  blue  and  the  actual  information  in  red.  The  pseudo 
header takes up 3×4 bytes and the UDP header 2×4 bytes so the total size of 
the header is 20 bytes.
In UDP, no connection between the transmitter and the receiver needs to be established 
to transfer data. Thus, without a connection, the application cannot make sure if the da-
tagrams have been delivered successfully or that in which order they are received. This 
may restrict the use of UDP in some applications because lack of error handling, but it 
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also has advantages: unlike in the TCP, which would be an alternative protocol for com-
munication over internet, there is no handshake process to establish the connection or a 
disconnecting process between the parties,  but only direct  delivery of the datagrams 
which decreases the delay time.
Also, because of the lack of acknowledgement on successfully transmitted datagrams, 
the data that is not delivered, is just dropped out instead of requesting the retransmission 
of  the  data.  This  is  advantageous  in  real-time  applications  such  as  audio  or  video 
streaming to decrease the number of interruptions in the data because of error correction 
and retransmission of the data. If the communication robustness in the application is 
critical, TCP can be used instead of UDP – or the application that is using UDP can im-
plement own error handling or connection mechanisms in the application protocol over 
the UDP.
The two transport layer protocols are compared in Table 3. In the comparison, it can be 
seen that UDP excels over TCP with high speed and low load but is less robust.
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Table 3. Comparison of the basic attributes of the UDP and TCP protocols. (Wiki-
books 2019).
Feature UDP TCP
Description Simple  high  speed low func-
tionality  wrapper  that  inter-
face  applications  to  the  net-
work layer and does little else.
Full-featured  protocol  that  al-
lows  applications  to  send  data 
reliably without worrying about 
network layer issues.
Connection setup Connectionless  data  is  sent 
without setup.
Connection-oriented; connection 
must  be  established  prior  to 
transmission.
Data interface to the 
application
Message  base -based;  data  is 
sent  in  discrete  packages  by 
the application.
Stream-based; data is sent by the 
application  with  no  particular 
structure.
Reliability  and  ac-
knowledgements
Unreliable best-effort delivery 
without acknowledgements.
Reliable delivery of message, all 
data is acknowledged.
Retransmissions Not  performed.  Applications 
must  detect  lost  data  and re-
transmit if needed.
Delivery of all data is managed, 
and  lost  data  is  retransmitted 
automatically.
Features provided to 
manage flow of data
None Flow control using sliding win-
dows,  window  size  adjustment 
heuristics and congestion avoid-
ance algorithms.
Overhead Very low Low, but higher than UDP
Transmission speed Very high High, but not as high as UDP
Data quantity suitab-
ility
From  small  to  moderate 
amounts of data.
From  small  to  very  large 
amounts of data.
2.5 Robot Framework test automation framework
Robot Framework is a generic automation framework for testing written in Python pro-
gramming language. In this thesis, Robot Framework is utilised to generate test func-
tionality and to run tests. With Robot Framework, first of all, the user can use a tabular 
based  syntax  to  create  a  test  case  and  start  its  execution  from the  command  line. 
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Secondly, Robot Framework is extendable; the user can create own keywords – which 
effectively behave like functions – each of which performs a user-defined action on the 
system under test. Thirdly, the user gets reports from  a test that is run by Robot Frame-
work. (Robot Framework 2019).
As stated, Robot Framework is modular, as it provides the framework for the test data 
syntax to pass the test data and the  application programmer interface (API) to imple-
ment the test actions for the system under test, the communication link, as shown in 
Fig. 14. 
So, the user can extend the framework by creating own keywords (functions); there are 
some built-in keywords exported by the Robot Framework itself but Python and Java 
programming languages are used to create test libraries, i.e. a unit containing multiple 
keywords. The keywords contain implementations that execute actions that test or valid-
ate the system under test either directly or by using a test tool. These keywords can then 
be called by a test case file that uses and has the access to the defined test library. (Ro-
bot Framework 2019).
Figure 14. Robot Framework provides the test data syntax and the application interface 
(API) to create tests for the system under test. (Robot Framework 2019).
Robot Framework provides also reporting and logging tools to gather data about the 
test. While running a test, the user gets informed of the test execution by log messages 
in the terminal. After the test is completed, an XML (eXtensible Markup Language) and 
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an HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) files are generated which the user can view on 
a web browser to easily take a look how the system under test behaves. (Robot Frame-
work 2019).
Following is an example of a Robot Framework test file, which tests a calculator applic-
ation. Here, the example uses a custom made test library called CalculatorLibrary. The 
test suite contains three test cases called  Additions,  Subtractions, and  Calculation er-
rors, the first two of which have two steps and the last test case,  Calculation errors, 
only one test step. These test cases are run in order when the test suite is executed. 
As shown in Algorithm 1, a user can define keywords not only in the test library with 
Python or Java but also in the test file, under the “*** Keywords ***” notation (here, 
“Calculate” and “Calculation should fail”). The user can define the arguments that can 
be passed for the keywords and then the test  steps that are executed when they are 
called. As can be seen, the keyword Calculate takes two arguments and calls the Push 
buttons keyword from the CalculatorLibrary which operates the action with the calcu-
lator application and also the Result should be keyword which validates the result.
*** Settings ***
Library           CalculatorLibrary
*** Test Cases ***
Additions
    Calculate    12 + 2 + 2    16
    Calculate    2 + -3        -1
Subtractions
    Calculate    12 - 2 - 2    8
    Calculate    2 - -3        5
Calculation errors     
    Calculation should fail    1 / 0         Division by zero.
*** Keywords ***
Calculate
    [Arguments]    ${expression}    ${expected}
    Push buttons    C${expression}=
    Result should be    ${expected}
Calculation should fail
    [Arguments]    ${expression}    ${expected}
    ${error} =    Should fail    C${expression}=
    Should be equal    ${expected}    ${error}
Algorithm 1. Example of a Robot Framework test sequence, containing a test case and 
custom keywords.
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The test library, CalculatorLibrary, can be implemented with Python to actually interact 
with the system under test, the calculator application, and it is implemented as a Python 
class, as shown in Algorithm 2. When a test is run by Robot Framework, it searches for 
the source files of the libraries that are defined in the test sequence, and calls the Python 
(or Java) function, when that step occurs in the test sequence.
from calculator import Calculator, CalculationError
class CalculatorLibrary(object):
    def __init__(self):
        self._calc = Calculator()
        self._result = ''
    def push_button(self, button):
        self._result = self._calc.push(button)
    def push_buttons(self, buttons):
        for button in buttons.replace(' ',''):
            self.push_button(button)
    def result_should_be(self, expected):
        if self._result != expected:
            raise AssertionError('%s != %s' % (self._result, ex-
pected))
    def should_fail(self, expression):
        try:
            self.push_buttons(expression)
        except CalculationError, err:
            return str(err)
        else:
            raise AssertionError("'%s' should have failed" % ex-
pression)
Algorithm 2. An example of implementing a custom library which provides functions 
that can be used in Robot Framework tests.
If the test sequence (in Algorithm 1) and the test library (Algorithm 2) are located in the 
current working directory, and Python and Robot Framework are installed, the previ-
ously given calculator test example could be run by executing a Python command
python -m robot calculator_test.robot
in the command line, where “-m robot” as a parameter means that a Python module 
called “robot” (Robot Framework) is used, and “calculator_test.robot” is the file name 
of the test sequence. The framework runs the test by using the keywords in the test file 
and in the test library, and after the execution, test result is printed on the console and 
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the reports from the test are generated for more in-detail inspection. As told, it is also 
possible to use Java programming language to implement the test libraries. However, 
because in this thesis, the test library is implemented in Python, any examples of how 
test libraries can be written and tests can be run with Java, are not described here.
In the previously described style, such Python keywords (functions) will be designed 
and implemented  in  the  following  chapters  for  the  error  generator  system to  inject 
faults. Of course, instead of pushing buttons of a calculator, they will send fault injec-
tion commands to the SoC-FPGA fault injector which will use the fault injection FPGA 
block to inject the faults.
Now that all the relevant theory for the error generator system is studied, the details of 
the system are discussed. After this, the design and the implementation of the system 
can begin.
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3 ERROR GENERATOR SYSTEM
Figure 15 depicts the proposed structure of the error generator system. This chapter de-
scribes each part of the error generator system in more detail in the subchapters.
Figure 15. The parts in the proposed solution of the error generator system. The figure 
is already introduced in Subchapter 1.2 about the objective of the thesis. The 
objective contains creating the components of the system that are inside the 
red dashed-line rectangle in the figure, thus excluding the fault injection lo-
gic block and the communication link or the nodes.
The focus of the description is more on those parts of the error generator system that are 
in the objective of the thesis. As a recall, these include the parts inside the red dashed-
line rectangle in Figure 15:
1. Robot Framework test library (RF test library), which will provide the logic that 
makes possible to create and run fault injection tests. Manual test templates are 
also provided. They can be used as reference when running the tests.
2. Communication between the test library on a personal computer (PC) and the 
SoC-FPGA fault injector. The communication is carried out over Ethernet with 
the UDP/IP protocol and is shown in the Figure 15 as “Ethernet cable”.
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3. Communication between the programmable system and the fault injection logic. 
The programmable system will receive injection requests from the Robot Frame-
work test library over Ethernet and pass them to the injection logic by using the 
provided AXI interface. Possible responses from the fault injector should also be 
handled properly.
The other parts of the system (high-speed communication,  the communicating nodes 
and especially the injection logic block) are also described shortly but they are not im-
plemented in this thesis. They are delivered either during the thesis or later by Danfoss. 
These parts are not needed for the implementation phase because the previously de-
scribed parts can be implemented and tested separately.
Creating the software for the programmable system depends on the fault injection logic 
IP (intellectual property) block. However, this does not block the development process. 
It can be implemented even if the block were not delivered as long as the description for 
the AXI interface  is  provided.  This  way the communication  over  the  AXI interface 
between the programmable system and the injection logic FPGA block can be designed 
and implemented.
3.1 Danfoss test automation system
The fault  injector  will be a part  of the Danfoss test  automation system as shown in 
Fig. 16. With the error generator system, it can be validated that the communication 
between the nodes works expectedly.
All the three parts designed and implemented (the SoC-FPGA fault injector, the Robot 
Framework test library and the communication between them) are used in the test auto-
mation system. Firstly, the Robot Framework test library is downloaded into a server 
machine which will automatically execute tests. Secondly, as can be seen in Fig. 16, the 
SoC-FPGA fault injector will be connected into the test automation server (instead of a 
personal computer) when it is integrated in the test automation system. Finally, the im-
plemented Ethernet  connection will  be used in the test  automation system to enable 
communication between the RF test library and the SoC-FPGA fault injector.
42
Figure 16. The schematic view of how the test automation system looks like. The error 
generator  system designed (RF test  library,  Ethernet  communication  and 
SoC-FPGA fault injector) in this thesis will be a part of it.
In the test automation system, the tests are run and the results are collected automatic-
ally.  Automatic  tests  with  comparison  with  manual  tests  are  discussed  more  in 
Subchapters 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.
3.2 High-speed communication link
A serial communication link will be connected to the fault injector for fault injection 
testing. The parties in the communication link are FPGA IP blocks inside the nodes, e.g. 
option boards of a frequency converter. The nodes transmit real-time data and configur-
ation data between each other over this serial communication link. However, the con-
tents of the data are irrelevant from the viewpoint of the thesis.
The  high-speed  communication  link  uses  a  proprietary  communication  protocol  de-
veloped in Danfoss. It uses a 8b/10b encoding which is an extended line coding. It maps 
8 bit words into 10 bit words which decreases the noise-to-signal ratio and reduces the 
DC offset because, in average, the number of 0 and 1 bits in the data are in balance after 
additional bits are inserted. Furthermore, with the increased number of bits, there are 
enough state transitions for synchronisation without significant increase in bandwidth. 
(Widmer & Franaszek 1983: 450).
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The packet, or the message, in the protocol consists of a message target address, data 
and a checksum. With the target address, the receiving IP block can route the message 
internally to the correct recipient within the block. The data integrity is validated with a 
CRC checksum and the most critical messages also include a sequence number.
In the protocol, the error management relies on the error detection by the CRC. The re-
ceiver drops a message if it is detected invalid by the CRC block. However, the receiver 
does  respond with neither a positive or a negative acknowledgement message upon re-
ceiving. This is because the transfer speed is extremely important in the communication. 
To increase the speed and to limit the bandwidth usage of the communication link, auto-
matic repeat requests (ACK messages) are not sent, or invalid messages are not retrans-
mitted. Nevertheless, to be robust, the transmitter should send a critical messages twice.
3.3 SoC-FPGA fault injector
The fault injector itself is a SoC-FPGA, as shortly described in the objectives of the 
thesis.  The SoC-FPGA fault  injector  will  contain  the  programmable  system (a  pro-
cessor) and the injection logic IP block (FPGA) developed by Danfoss. The communic-
ation link, where the faults will eventually be injected, is connected to the latter, the in-
jection logic block.
3.3.1 Fault injection logic of the SoC-FPGA fault injector
The fault injector logic block is an FPGA module that will be developed by Danfoss and 
will be integrated into the SoC-FPGA fault injector. It takes the serial data in, injects a 
fault into the correct package depending on the values passed from the programmable 
system over the AXI interface, and passes either unmodified or modified serial data out.
The injection logic will be connected to the programmable system as an IP block by us-
ing the provided AXI interface. The AXI interface of the injector logic block will (at 
least) contain the following data input: the fault type, the target address and the number 
of repetitions, i.e. how many times the error will be injected. With the target address in-
put, the injection logic finds a message which contains the given target address and in-
jects the fault to the message. The fault type is one of the following:
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1. CRC fault: The injection logic flips bits in the message data so that the CRC cal-
culation is violated. The CRC field is kept as is.
2. Change target address: The injection logic changes the target address of the mes-
sage. The receiving node would route the message according to the address to a 
wrong block inside the node.
3. Increasing/decreasing the length of the message: The injector removes or adds 
data in the message.
4. Duplicate: The message is sent twice with same contents.
5. Removing the message: The message is lost by the injection logic and thus not 
received.
The nodes should detect the errors (e.g. by using the CRC sum) in the messages and re-
act accordingly. The response to an invalid message depends on i.a. how critical the 
message and the fault are and thus cannot be generalised. In extreme cases, precaution-
ary measures, i.e. motor shutdown, may be carried out by the receiver if an error is de-
tected.
The injection logic provides data output for the programmable system, too. The injec-
tion  logic  acknowledges  a  successful  fault  injection  to  the  communication  link  by 
passing  an acknowledgement over the AXI interface to the programmable system. The 
acknowledgement contains the type of the fault that was injected. The programmable 
system should handle these responses properly and pass the acknowledgement forward 
to the Robot Framework test library.
However, the injection logic can only return data about the fault injection process itself. 
It can give information if the fault could not be injected but it does not know whether 
the receiving node processed the fault correctly. This should be managed by the enclos-
ing framework, the test automation system (see Subchapter 3.4.3 Automatic tests).
3.3.2 Communication between the fault injector and the test library
The fault injector is connected to Robot Framework test library on a PC over Ethernet.  
The communication is built on UDP/IP. Thus, the processing system of the fault injector 
must be able to handle UDP datagrams and parse the request of the datagram sent by the 
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Robot Framework test library. Furthermore, the fault injector system has to be able to 
send data in the other direction, back to the PC, too.
Even though TCP/IP alternative would have been a more robust alternative for commu-
nication between the fault injector and the test library, UDP was selected because it is 
more lightweight and faster as it was discussed and compared in Subchapter 2.4.2. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, the SoC-FPGA board of the fault injector will be 
used for other operations (outside this thesis) where UDP will be used. So for better 
maintainability and extensibility, using UDP was included in the specifications so that 
only one protocol would be used in the SoC-FPGA fault injector on the transport layer. 
As a conclusion, UDP was selected mainly for the latter reason, and no additional com-
parison is  made in  this  thesis  on the speed,  the bandwidth-usage and the reliability 
between TCP and UDP.
In this thesis, a simple application protocol is built on top of the UDP to send data 
between the RF test library and the fault injector. Without it, the contents of datagrams 
sent by UDP are meaningless themselves. The protocol should describe the format in 
which the requests to the fault injector and the responses from it are represented in a 
UDP  datagram.  If  the  fault  injector  needs  setup  data,  the  communication  protocol 
should also define the format for it.
3.4 Test library with Robot Framework
3.4.1 Robot Framework keywords for fault injection
Robot Framework keywords are written in Python programming language as Python 
functions. There is one keyword for each of the five fault types described in Subchapter 
3.3.1. Each keyword takes also a repeat number and a target address as their paramet-
ers, so that the number of injected faults and the target address of the message can be 
configured. The flow of the keyword is shown in Fig. 17.
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Figure 17. A sequence diagram describing how the data flows from a Robot Frame-
work keyword (RF keyword) to the fault injection logic and eventually into 
the communication link as a generated error.
All the keywords have somewhat same functionality. When the keyword is executed, a 
UDP datagram containing the fault type, repeat number and address is generated and 
sent over Ethernet to the fault injector. Before sending the data, the keywords wrap the 
information in a datagram that has a predefined format so that the injector can read and 
understand the data. This format will be specified in Subchapter 4.2.
After the datagram is sent, each keyword should wait for a UDP response datagram 
from the injector. The fault injector validates the request that is sent. It also gets the re-
sponse from the fault injection logic that the fault was injected successfully. If the re-
sponse was positive, the injector sends a UDP datagram containing a positive acknow-
ledgement,  otherwise a  negative  acknowledgement.  Thus,  if  the  keyword receives  a 
negative acknowledgement or does not receive any acknowledgement within a defined 
time period, it should mark the keyword execution as failed. This is done by raising an 
exception; the built-in features of Robot Framework then stop the test execution and 
mark the test as failed with a message that is given by the keyword.
47
In addition to the five keywords which are used to inject faults, there will be additional 
keywords  to  execute  setup  and  utilisation  functions  on  the  fault  injector.  Setup 
keywords can include changing IP addresses and ports of the fault injector or fetching 
version information. 
3.4.2 Manual (targeted) tests
In manual tests in general, the person running a test, a tester, manually runs a test by fol-
lowing a predefined test plan. Furthermore, the tester reads manually the output of the 
test program and validates the output to determine if the test was successful or not.
In the fault injection testing, a Robot Framework test file is started manually by the 
tester  on  a  PC.  The  test  sequence  in  the  test  file  contains  a  list  of  fault-injection 
keywords that are to be executed. Then, after the test has finished, statistics are collec-
ted from nodes of the communication link, and they are manually read to validate that 
the fault detection and management behaviour of the nodes worked expectedly. Also, 
during the test execution, the tester should monitor log messages of Robot Framework 
to see whether the actual fault injection operations are executed successfully.
With targeted test, the tester can specify which faults should be injected. This can be 
useful,  when only certain fault  types or a specific target address needs to be tested. 
However, unlike in automatic tests, the tester needs to be present during the test and has 
to read the test output manually. Also, unless the test results are in a clear format, the 
tester must know how to interpret the read test output correctly to define the result of the 
test.
3.4.3 Automatic tests
With automatic tests, a test process is done completely automatically. Tests execution 
are started and executed automatically either by a trigger or at a specific point of time, 
e.g. once a day. The results of the tests are read automatically and stored in a human-
readable format. Usually, if the automatic tests are run periodically, the operator of the 
automatic test system is notified in case the test were not completed successfully, so that 
proper actions can be carried out.
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The fault injection tests will be executed in the test automation system. The test automa-
tion system will consist of a server machine, which has a script that will run a Robot 
Framework test sequence automatically. The sequence contains all the fault injection 
tests so that all faults will be injected and tested automatically. After the test has run, the 
test automation system is capable of collecting the statistical data from the nodes to de-
tect, whether the faults were detected and handled correctly in the receiver. Collecting 
statistics about the communication and analysing them is done outside of the error gen-
erator system and thus is outside the scope of the thesis and not discussed here in detail.
The advantage is that the tests could be automatically run when a new software binary is 
downloaded into a node. Because a tester does not have to be present, tests with longer 
duration and a wide range of target addresses and repetition count can be automatically 
executed overnight and results can be read next day. However, running the automatic 
tests here requires that the development of the test automation system – which this error 
generator system will eventually be part of – is finished. Because that development pro-
cess is not the objective of the thesis, it is possible that results of automatic tests cannot 
be included in this report.
The components of the error generator system are now described. As a recall, the error 
generator system consists of
1. Robot Framework test library, which will be used to create and run tests and 
which communicates with the SoC-FPGA fault injector over Ethernet,
2. SoC-FPGA fault  injector,  which has a processing system (a processor) and a 
fault injection FPGA block, latter of which is not created in this thesis, and
3. the serial communication link and the nodes, e.g. option boards, which commu-
nicate over the link, and which are not created here but provided for the testing 
phase.
Now that the system is described, it is designed and implemented for those parts that are 
included in the objective. Those include the RF test library and the SoC-FPGA fault in-
jector and the UDP/IP communication between them.
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4 DESIGNING THE ERROR GENERATOR SYSTEM
This chapter describes how the error generator system is designed. The design process 
proceeds hierarchically,  starting from an abstract structure description of the system, 
eventually ending into designing the detailed flow of a single algorithm. Design tools 
such as component diagrams, class graphs and pseudo code are utilised in the design 
process.
The design starts with defining the top-level components and their responsibilities for 
the error generator system. From the requirements in the Subchapter 1.2 describing the 
objectives of the thesis and the description of the system in the previous chapter, three 
main components of the design could be identified easily. The initial component hier-
archy is shown in Fig. 18. All these three main components are then designed individu-
ally and the design is described in the following subchapters.
Figure 18. The objective consists of designing the test library, (the programmable sys-
tem of) the fault injector and the UDP/IP communication between them. As 
stated, the fault injection logic block (the dashed rectangle on the right) is 
not in the objective, but will be used in the ready system.
The UDP/IP communication is the backbone of the whole system which is why it is de-
signed first. It defines the message format and the supported messages for the commu-
nication to make the communication between the test library and the fault injector pos-
sible. To increase the robustness, an error handling mechanism can be designed, too. 
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After the UDP/IP communication is designed, the test library and fault injector design 
process can begin.
The Robot Framework test library has a UDP handler block, which supports the previ-
ously mentioned UDP/IP communication and its message formats. It is responsible of 
sending the messages and receiving them. Eventually, the messages that are handled by 
the UDP handler, are sent and received by the Robot Framework keywords. They are 
split into two sets; the fault injection keywords execute a specific fault injection test and 
the setup and helper keywords change settings in the fault injector or provide additional 
functionality. These all are contained in a Robot Framework Test Library, implemented 
as classes and functions in the Python programming language.
The test library also has example test sequences implemented as Robot Framework test 
files. The test files are templates to show how the fault injection tests and setup func-
tions in the Robot Framework test library can be called in a Robot Framework test file. 
This template can then be used to create and execute manual tests in the testing phase.
Like the RF test library, the programmable system of the fault injector contains a UDP 
handler module which handles the incoming and outgoing UDP datagrams. The UDP 
handler of the PS then parses the request and calls the AXI handler. The AXI handler 
sends the fault injection request to the fault injection logic block over the AXI interface, 
gets the response and returns it back to the UDP handler.
4.1 Design of the UDP/IP communication
Here, the design of the communication with UDP between the RF test library and the 
SoC-FPGA  fault  injector  is  given.  First,  to  ensure  reliable  UDP communication,  a 
method to increase robustness is selected and fine-tuned. Then, the actual format of a 
datagram is designed by first recalling the requirements and then defining the format.
4.1.1 UDP communication data flow
As already stated, the UDP protocol is a connectionless protocol. This means that to 
send a datagram, a communication between the sender and the receiver does not need to 
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be established. This increases speed but the sender cannot be sure whether the receiver 
has got the datagram. Our protocol over the UDP communication must address this is-
sue somehow.
A simple way to ensure a successful transmission is to use acknowledgements. This, 
however, would require that acknowledgement and the retransmission procedures are 
designed, which causes extra work.  This would also use extra bandwidth and cause 
delay which decreases the advantage of using the UDP. Furthermore, and most import-
antly, defining an acknowledgement procedure in our protocol would be reinventing the 
wheel since such mechanism is already implemented successfully in TCP.
To understand the effects of the errors on the communication link, different error hand-
ling mechanisms were studied in Subchapter 2.2.3. This information, however, turns out 
to be useful when designing the UDP communication. For blind transmission, it was 
given that “to reduce the number of lost packets, the transmitter can send a packet mul-
tiple times and ‘hope’ that at least one of them will receive the destination”. 
So in our UDP protocol, all the messages are sent three times so that at least one data -
gram will be received properly. However, to avoid duplicates, the message must contain 
an increasing message identifier number, so that only one message is handled and the 
remaining messages with the same identifier are ignored. This is to avoid accidentally 
generating a same fault multiple times in the fault injection logic block; the error gener-
ator system could provide ambiguous results in testing, when a successful transmission 
of a package was expected in the link, but an error occurs unexpectedly because of a du-
plicate fault injection command processed by the SoC-FPGA fault injector.
4.1.2 UDP datagram structure
All the data is sent as characters in the datagram. This way, the implementation can be 
made faster when the datagram contents are in a more human-readable format in strings 
of characters instead of plain bytes. The most of the datagrams are created in the Robot 
Framework test library on Python where manipulating character sequences (strings) is 
fast and easy, though manipulating bytes is possible, too. Sending the data as characters 
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significantly increases the datagram size compared to sending as “raw” bytes, so they 
must be kept as short as possible. 
However, recalling from Subchapter 2.4.2, Figure 13, that the headers of a UDP data-
gram already take up 20 bytes of the total size. Using the binary format does compress 
the size of the payload but the relative decrease in the total size of the datagram is not 
significant, if the length of the data in the string format would be around the length of 
the header, as it is in this use case.
As previously stated in Subchapter 4.1.1, the datagram should contain an identifier field 
to avoid duplicates. This is done by starting the datagram with a one-character (byte) 
field containing a number from 0 to 9 (the message identifier field). The message should 
start with this identifier and the receiver should drop a datagram with an identifier as the 
same as that of the previous datagram. No action is needed when the message identifier 
shifts by more than one value between the consecutive datagrams.
To identify, what kind of message is sent by the datagram, the datagram type field is ap-
pended to the datagram after the message identifier separated by a space character. Four 
characters are reserved for this field for extensibility purposes. The message type can be 
for example a request to inject a fault or it can be an acknowledgement from the fault 
injector  that  the  fault  injection  was  successful.  These  types  are  discussed  more  in 
Subchapter 4.1.3.
Furthermore, some messages need additional information, i.e. parameters. These are ad-
ded to the end of the datagram, again after a space character separating them from the 
previous field. If more than one parameter is sent, they are separated by a space.
The datagram format is now complete. The full datagram format is shown in Table 4. 
As can be seen, the minimum length of the datagram is six (6) characters if the message 
type does not require parameters. Thus, if the receiver receives a datagram shorter than 
that, it can safely ignore it. The maximum length of the datagram is defined later, when 
the message types are defined, because the maximum length of a datagram depends on 
the maximum length of the combined parameters at the end of the datagram.
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Table 4. The datagram format with the field names and the length for each field.
Field Message identifier (0–9) Space Message Type Space Parameters
Length (chars) 1 1 4 1 1–…
Required yes yes yes no no
4.1.3 Message types for a datagram
After  the  datagram format  is  designed and defined,  the  contents  of  a  datagram are 
defined. These include defining the message types and the possible parameters of a mes-
sage.
The fault injection keywords of the test library send the fault injection requests to the 
fault injector. Thus, because there are five possible types of a fault, each  type for a fault 
injection must have its own message type. The fault injection needs also the target ad-
dress and the number of repeats to be successful, as stated in the description of the fault 
injection logic, so these two values must be sent as the parameters of a fault injection 
datagram. Again, the type identifier is defined as a string of characters to make it easier 
to develop the communication handling in the test library and in the SoC-FPGA, and 
also, when later testing the UDP communication, to make debugging the received and 
sent datagrams easier.
Furthermore, from the setup and helper keywords, the following data can be sent to the 
fault injector: set IP address, set UDP port, set communication link type and get the ver-
sion information of the fault injection logic IP block. Here, setting the IP address and 
the port refers to the address and port of the PC running the Robot Framework, so that 
the fault injection logic knows in which address send the data back. Naturally, these two 
take an IP address or a port as their parameter. The message type to set the communica-
tion link type has one numeric parameter that describes the communication link type.
Finally, there should be a possibility to send a “test started” message from the RF test 
library to the SoC-FPGA fault injector at the beginning of a test. With this, the fault in-
jector can reset its message identifier number, so that if the very first message of the test 
sent from the Robot Framework is the same as that of the last test, the datagram is not  
accidentally ignored as a duplicate.
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All the possible messages that can be sent from the RF test library to the SoC-FPGA 
fault injector are defined. The message types with their four-character identifiers and the 
possible parameters are listed in Table 5.
Table 5. The proposed message types and parameters from the RF test library to the 
SoC-FPGA fault injector.
Message description Message type string Parameters
(Inject) CRC fault fcrc target address, repeats
Address change fault fadr target address, repeats
Length change fault flen target address, repeats
Duplicate message fault fdup target address, repeats
Drop message fault fdrp target address, repeats
Set IP address sipa IP address
Set UDP port spor UDP port
Set communication link type sclt communication link type
Get injection logic version gilv
Start test sequence strt
Also, the fault injector sends data via UDP back to the Robot Framework test library. 
These messages follow the previously defined datagram format. The fault injector re-
turns the positive or negative acknowledgement about the injected fault, and the fault in-
jection logic block version, when requested. The message types with their parameters 
are shown in Table 6. To keep the consistency with the four-character message type 
definition, an underscore is prefixed at the beginning of the three-letter message type 
identifiers.
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Table 6. The proposed message types and parameters from the fault injector to the 
RF test library.
Message description Message type string Parameters
Positive acknowledgement _ack
Negative acknowledgement _nak
Injection  logic  version  in-
formation
_ilv injection logic version
The UDP handler modules of the RF test library and the programmable system on the 
SoC-FPGA fault injector should follow these datagram format definitions. For example, 
when a request to inject a CRC fault 5 times to address “12345678” is sent from the RF 
test library, a following datagram will be sent three times
0 fcrc 12345678 5
and if the fault was injected successfully, the fault injector would respond with
0 _ack
4.2 Design of the Robot Framework test library
The Robot Framework test library consists of the test libraries and a template test se-
quence or sequences. Furthermore, the test library will have fault injection keywords 
(Robot Framework’s “functions”) and set-up or configuration keywords. A UDP hand-
ler will be included in this Robot Framework test library to provide communication, but 
it will a separate Python module or class and not directly in the test library.
The test sequences should contain templates to show how the keywords are used when 
running a test with Robot Framework. There should be templates and examples how to 
create and run a fault injection test and how to use the setup functions. These test design 
templates can be designed either here on in the test preparation phase. This hierarchy 
and the relationships the parts is depicted in Figure 19.
56
Figure 19. Components of the test  library. The test  library utilises the UDP handler 
component to execute the keywords. The test templates are test sequences 
with examples how to call the keywords.
4.2.1 Design of the fault injection keywords
Effectively, all the fault injection keywords are the same meaning that the body of a Py-
thon function is almost identical for all the functions. Only the type of the fault injection 
changes, which, as described in Subchapter 4.1.2, means that the message type is differ-
ent. Thus, this nuance can be ignored when designing all the keywords at once.
The flow diagram describing how the process in a fault injection keyword proceeds, is 
depicted in Fig. 20. The elements that are on the right side of the dashed vertical line 
represent actions of which logic is encapsulated in the UDP handler component, and, 
thus, are designed later.
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Figure 20. The flow diagram of a fault  injection keyword. The steps located on the 
right side of the dashed line represent the actions that happen in the UDP 
handler which will be designed later.
Firstly, each fault injection keyword takes a target address and the number of repeats as 
their parameters. First, the parameters should be validated when executing a keyword. 
Currently, no requirements are specified for the target address so any non-empty value 
should be accepted. Nevertheless, the number of repeats should have a numeric value 
that is greater than 0. Maximum value is not specified – unless more specifications are 
provided.
After the parameter validation, the UDP handler is utilised, as can be seen in Fig. 20. 
The parameters, and the fault injection type which is included in the keyword itself, are 
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passed to the UDP handler to create a datagram with correct format. Then, this datagram 
is sent by the UDP handler, which takes the responsibility to send the datagram as it is 
designed. All the errors in this phase should be considered fatal and lead to stopping the 
execution of the keyword.
The keyword waits for the acknowledgement after it has sent the fault injection request. 
Yet again, the UDP handler receives the datagram and returns it to the keyword. If the 
datagram was received within a configurable timeout, its contents are read by the UDP 
handler. If the response is a positive acknowledgement, the error injection was success-
ful and this is output to the user. However, if anything else is received, the injection is 
assumed to be failed. In case of fail (timeout or a non-positive acknowledgement), an 
error should be thrown so that the execution of the whole test case will fail.
4.2.2 Design of the setup keywords
As already shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19, there are setup and helper keywords 
modify  or  fetch  the  values  of  the  error  generator  system.  Firstly,  the 
set_comm_link_type keyword should send a datagram to the fault injector to configure 
the type of the communication link that is connected to the fault injection logic block. 
The flow of this keyword follows the logic of the fault injection keywords. The input 
parameter, communication link type, is validated and a datagram is created and sent by 
the UDP handler. However, nothing is returned from the fault injector after the link type 
is set. So, after the “Send UDP datagram” step in Fig. 20, this keyword will reach the 
end.
The get_version, of which logical flow is depicted in Figure 21, will fetch the version of 
the fault injection logic IP block from the fault injector. Thus, it needs to make a request 
by sending an UDP datagram and handle the response. However, because it does not 
have any parameters, no validation step is included before sending the datagram. After 
the response has been got, it is validated and printed to the user if it was received suc-
cessfully within a timeout period.
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Figure 21. Flow diagram of the keyword that will get and return the version of the fault 
injection logic IP block. Here, “valid datagram” means that the received da-
tagram had the type “_ilv” which indicates that the datagram contains the in-
jection logic version.
However, as can be seen in Fig. 21, because the keyword fetches data, the version in-
formation should be returned from the keyword. Returning the value from the keyword 
makes it possible to handle this value inside a Robot Framework test sequence and cre-
ate conditional tests depending on the version of the fault injection logic block. For ex-
ample, a following Robot Framework test sequence could be created with which reads 
the version of the injection logic block into a variable called version and executes a test 
step depending on the version
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${version}= Get Version
Run Keyword If
    ${version} == '0.2' Inject CRC Fault  1234  2
This snippet of a Robot Framework example test sequence would inject a CRC fault 
twice to address “1234” if the fault injector version was 0.2. Otherwise it would skip the 
CRC fault  injection.  Robot Framework’s built-in function “Run keyword if” is used 
here and it takes a condition as its first parameter and the keyword which will be ex-
ecuted if the condition was true as the second parameter.
Two setting keywords, set  IP address and set  UDP port,  are yet to be designed. To 
design the two, it must be clear that setting an IP address and port can be done for both 
“upstream” and “downstream”. Here, the upstream address and port refer to the destina-
tion of the datagrams from the RF test library to the fault injector. Thus, the upstream 
address and port should be that of the fault injector. In contrary, setting the downstream 
address and port defines, where the fault injector will forward its datagrams. So, both 
the keywords have two parameters; the IP address or UDP port, and an additional para-
meter  to define whether  the setting configuration  is  done for “upstream” or “down-
stream” values.
Setting the upstream values do nothing more than modify only specific variables and no 
data is sent over UDP. The IP address or port value is first validated, and then the value  
is stored in a variable, so that the UDP handler will send the next datagram using the 
defined destination. However, configuring the downstream address and port values re-
quire sending a UDP datagram to the fault injector, which means that the upstream val-
ues must be configured before. Furthermore, when the downstream port or address is 
changed, the UDP handler must start to listen for UDP datagrams on that endpoint in-
stead and close the previous UDP socket. This logic is more comprehensible in the flow 
diagram in Figure 22.
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Figure 22. The flow diagram of ”set_ip_address” and ”set_udp_port”. For clarity, cre-
ating and sending a UDP datagram processes are compressed into a  one 
block. The operations ”Close previous UDP socket” and ”Listen on new 
port/address” are encapsulated inside the UDP handler module.
4.2.3 Designing the UDP handler
Sending and receiving UDP datagrams to and from the fault injector is encapsulated in a 
module called UDP handler. It is responsible of sending datagrams to the correct ad-
dress to the SoC-FPGA fault injector. It also receives the datagrams sent by the fault in-
jector. The datagrams must follow the designed UDP/IP communication paradigm: the 
UDP handler sends datagrams according to this specification and validates that the re-
ceived datagrams follow the definition. Finally, there must be an access point, an inter-
face to the UDP handler, so that the Robot Framework test library can use the methods 
and consume information that is handled by the UDP handler without caring about how 
the logic is carried out internally.
The design starts by identifying the main components of the UDP handler. Since the re-
sponsibility of the UDP handler is to send and receive datagrams, it is natural that the 
module is split into separate components for receiving and sending. The UDP handler 
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module will contain a UDP handler class, which is the main class and the interface to 
the module for the Robot Framework keywords. Thus, it has simple functions for both 
sending a datagram and getting the last received datagram. Furthermore, it has setup 
functions to configure the upstream and downstream endpoints, and it will contain the 
later-described UDP receiver and sender instances in its properties to send and receive 
the data. Upon initialisation of this class, it will also initialise the later-designed UDP 
sender and receiver for starting the communication. Full contents of the class can be 
seen in Fig. 23.
As can be seen in Fig. 23, this module also has a UDP datagram class, of which in-
stances represent a single datagram. An instance encapsulates the needed information 
for a datagram, and because of the object-oriented format, the contents of a datagram 
are more accessible by the Robot Framework keywords that if it would be a plain string 
of characters. With this, unnecessary and redundant parsing of a datagram is avoided. 
Also, creating a new datagram for sending is more convenient than manually creating 
the contents of a datagram for each sent item.
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Figure 23. The class diagram of the UDP handler module. The UDP handler class is 
the top-level class and the entry point for UDP-related operations for the test 
library; it contains a sender and a receiver, which have functions of handling 
datagrams in one direction. The methods and the fields of the classes are de-
scribed in this subchapter.
The UDP sender has the target address and target port for the destination which can be 
changed. It also contains the message id that will be increased for each message sent.  
When the send function is called, the sender will convert the given UDP datagram into a 
string of characters and finally sends it multiple times to the destination, as previously 
described in the Subchapter 4.1 about the UDP communication. It also makes sure that 
the identifier of the datagram is increased according to the specification after each sent 
datagram, so the receiving end will distinguish new datagrams from duplicates.
The design of the UDP receiver class is more complex than the sender class. This is be-
cause it is designed to run in a separate thread, i.e. in parallel at the same time with 
other functions. This way, the receiver can constantly listen incoming datagrams. The 
other alternative would be sending a datagram and then starting to listen for incoming 
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datagrams. This is also possible because it is the Robot Framework libraries who are al-
ways initiating the UDP communication. This means there cannot be a received data-
gram, a response, from the fault injector unless a datagram, a request, has been sent to 
the fault injector first. However, running the receiver in a separate thread allows more 
modular  design  when  sending  and  receiving  functionalities  are  divided  in  different 
classes. Also, constantly listening in parallel means that the main thread is not blocked 
because of receiving a datagram. Anyhow, if any problems with this  design are en-
countered during the implementation phase, the alternative design (first send and then 
listen) can be used.
The “startListening” function of the UDP listener  will  begin a new thread and start 
listening packets after checking that the previous thread is not running. The target port 
and address  are  passed  as  parameters  to  the  function  as  described in  the  following 
pseudo code function:
Check if already listening.
If already listening,
    request to stop listening and wait for one second.
    If still listening, throw an error and exit.
Create a new thread.
If IP address and UDP port not defined, use default values.
Listen endlessly in the another thread with the address & 
port.
Start the thread and store it in receiverThread variable.
The “listenEndlessly” will be executed in a separate thread, as described in the previous 
pseudo code design. It will create a socket and constantly listen for incoming packets. If 
a datagram is received, it is passed to a  handle function, which does the conversion 
from a plain string to a UDP datagram object, and also validates that the contents of the 
datagram for correct format and for duplicates. As pseudo code, the logic of the function 
can be described with the next pseudo code snippet:
Reset "stop thread" status
Reset the last received datagram identifier number
Create a UDP Socket and bind it to the given endpoint
Until stopping the thread is requested,
    wait for incoming UDP datagram,
    and send the datagram contents to the handle function.
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The handle function, as said, will parse and validate the datagram. Then, if the datagram 
is valid, it will be stored in a variable  lastReceivedDatagram  by handle function. To 
there, the UDP handler, the “main” class of the module, will provide an interface to 
fetch the last received datagram by the receiver. When the getLastReceived function of 
the UDP handler is called, it also clears the value of the said variable for the last re-
ceived datagram. So, when the function is called next time, an empty value will indicate 
that no new datagrams were received by the receiver. Thus, the storage for the last re-
ceived datagram will act as a one-slot stack or queue for incoming datagrams. The logic 
in pseudo code of the lastReceivedDatagram function will be just the following:
Get the last received datagram from the UDP receiver.
If the datagram was not empty,
    reset the last received datagram of the UDP receiver to 
'empty'.
Return the last received datagram.
As can be seen in Fig. 19, the part “Robot Framework test library” is now designed, ex-
cept the test templates. Because they are strongly dependent on the implementation and 
are rather trivial, they will be only introduced in the testing chapter. Thus, this means 
that only designing the software for the SoC-FPGA is remaining for the design phase.
4.3 Design of the SoC-FPGA fault injector
In this subchapter, the remaining component of the error generator system, the SoC-
FPGA fault injector is designed. Roughly, it can be considered as a UDP listener or 
server, that waits a request in incoming UDP datagrams, executes an action and if re-
quired,  returns a result  over UDP to the Robot Framework. Usually,  “the action” is 
sending a command to the fault injection logic block over the AXI interface to inject a 
fault in the communication link. 
As it is already described, the action can also be configuring some settings or fetching 
the version information. However, the main functionality of the fault injector can be di-
vided into two parts; the UDP handler that deals with the incoming datagrams, and the 
AXI module or “AXI handler”, which sends a command to the programmable logic – 
the fault injection logic – over the AXI interface. To avoid ambiguity between the UDP 
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handler of the fault injector and that of the RF test library, the UDP handler will be 
called “UDP server” from now on. These two modules as parts of the fault injector are 
depicted in a component diagram in Fig. 24.
Figure 24. Component diagram of the SoC-FPGA fault injector. The UDP server is the 
core of the fault injector and the relationship between it and the AXI handler 
as well as the state variables which contain needed configuration data.
As shown in Fig. 24, the UDP server contains functionality to receive, handle, create 
and send a datagram. The fault injector, after the initialisation, will start to wait for in-
coming datagrams by receiving them. The received datagram is handled, and a proper 
action is executed by invoking a function in the AXI handler or writing and reading 
configuration data, depending on the received request. Also, depending on the request, a 
datagram can be created and sent back to Robot Framework test library. The design of 
these components are described more in the following subchapters.
4.3.1 Designing the UDP server
The UDP server receives and handles the incoming datagrams. Unlike the UDP handler 
in the Robot Framework test library, the receiving can be  blocking, meaning that the 
program execution is blocked until a datagram is received. This is because actions in the 
fault injector are always triggered by sending a datagram from the test library.
After the SoC-FPGA fault injector is started, it will open a UDP socket and start listen-
ing for datagrams. The address and the port cannot be changed when the fault injector is 
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running, meaning that the address of the fault injector must be configured correctly in 
the RF test library. After a datagram is received, a correct action is executed, as stated in 
the following diagram in Fig. 25.
Figure 25. The flow diagram of the UDP server. In the second decision, after validating 
a datagram, a duplicate means that the message identifier of the datagram is 
the same as that of the previously received datagram. The type refers to the 
message types defined in Table 4.
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From Figure 25, one can recognise the required functionality. This functionality can be 
separated in individual procedures, functions, which will be designed and implemented 
each on their own. Thus, the UDP handler consists of the following functions:
1. Wait and receive datagram, which receives a datagram and stores its contents in 
a shared variable.
2. Validate datagram, which checks that the datagram consists of earlier defined 
fields; a message identifier (a number), message type (a four-character string) 
and parameters. If the datagram is valid, each field is stored in a corresponding 
variable or a field in a structure or an object.
3. Check duplicate, which compares the message identifier of the datagram to the 
previous one. The datagram is ignored if the identifier is the same and the mes-
sage type is not “start sequence”, in which case the identifier variable is reset so 
that next datagram won’t be treated as a duplicate.
4. Execute action, which will check the message type and execute the correspond-
ing action. After the action has been executed, the variable containing the identi-
fier of the last message is increased for duplicate validation.
5. Change endpoint, which  is  executed  when the  received  datagram requests  a 
change in the IP address or port. A new value is stored in a variable and next da-
tagram  will  be  sent  to  the  newly  configured  endpoint.  Thus,  this  function 
changes only the destination of the outgoing datagrams, since the IP address and 
port of the device are hard-coded and cannot be changed after booting.
6. Set link type, which sends a command with the later-described AXI handler to 
change the type of the communication link. This is needed because the fault in-
jection  logic  block  must  have  a  configurable  (numeric)  communication  link 
type.
7. Inject a fault, which injects the requested fault to the communication link by 
sending a command to the fault injection logic with the AXI handler. It will also 
wait for a response from the AXI for a short time and send the acknowledge-
ment with UDP, if response was received. The “Get version info” will work in 
the same way; the request and the response to and from the AXI are just differ-
ent, but the response is sent afterwards to Robot Framework over UDP.
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8. Create and send datagram, which creates a datagram with the required elements 
and send it three times. It also handles increasing the message identifier for out-
going datagrams after each sent datagram, so that the receiving end will notice 
and drop the duplicates.
4.3.2 Designing the AXI handler
The AXI handler manages the communication between the fault injection logic on the 
FPGA and the processing system (the processor) of the SoC-FPGA over the AXI. It 
provides an interface for the programmable system so that it can call functions of the 
AXI handler to inject faults and set the communication link type and get the version in-
formation of the fault injection logic block.
Fault injection function sends a fault injection request over the AXI to the fault injec-
tion logic. It takes fault type, number of repeats and the target address as parameters. 
The number of repeats and target address are numeric parameters. Also, the fault type is 
a number in range 0–4 that enumerates the type of the fault: 0 = CRC fault, 1 = change 
address, 2 = change length, 3 = duplicate message and 4 = remove message. Firstly, the 
function validates that the input parameter values are in valid range, then converts them 
into an AXI suitable message and finally sends the message to the fault injection logic 
with AXI. After injecting the fault, the AXI handler reads data from the fault injection 
logic; the logic will return the type of the fault if the fault was successfully injected. 
Thus, a positive value is returned from the function if the fault injection acknowledge-
ment was correct. Otherwise, if the acknowledgement does not match the type of the 
fault or cannot be read, or if the input parameters were invalid, an error code is returned. 
Hereby, the UDP server can then send the correct return value back to the Robot Frame-
work.
Get version info works somewhat similarly as the previous function. However, it does 
not need any input parameters. So, when the function is called, the AXI handler makes 
an AXI read request on the correct address to get the version information. After reading, 
depending on the format in which the value is read, the AXI handler makes the neces-
sary parsing and type conversion for the value, and returns it to the caller.
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Set link type sets the type of the communication link that is connected to the fault injec-
tion logic. Because the fault injection logic is in the development phase while the thesis 
is being done, it is not yet sure what kind of values can be set for the communication 
link type. However, for extensibility purposes, this function is designed to take a nu-
meric argument and write it over AXI to the fault injection logic. No return value is read 
afterwards.
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5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ERROR GENERATOR SYSTEM
After designing the error generator system, the system was implemented. During the 
implementation phase, some flaws were found in the design, which required re-design-
ing some parts of the system. These modifications are discussed first, and then the im-
plementation details of the two modules (Robot Framework test library and SoC-FPGA 
fault injector) are given.
5.1 Redesign and general notes on the implementation
5.1.1 Redesigning the message identifier of the datagram
While making initial tests for the first implementation, erroneous behaviour was detec-
ted which was traced to be caused by the message identifier of datagrams. The initial 
design suggested that the datagram has a one-number identifier, which will roll back to 
0 after the maximum value, 9, is reached.
There, however, were some problems when UDP datagrams were kept hanging in the 
network. This caused them to be handled as non-duplicate datagrams, when they finally 
after multiple seconds, or even minutes, reached the destination, the fault injector. This 
is illustrated in Figure 26.
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Figure 26. Datagram with identifier 1 arrives late. It is treated as not duplicate, because 
the identifier does not equal with the last received datagram.
Recalling that every datagram is sent three times, it is possible that one (or more) of the 
datagrams does not reach the destination or arrives very late. Finally, if the datagram ar-
rives and it has a different identifier than the last received datagram has, the fault in-
jector sees it as a correct (not a duplicate) datagram and executes the specified action. 
This is harmful, if the datagram contained a fault injection request, causing the fault in-
jector accidentally inject a fault at a wrong time, either during a test or even after the 
test. As already discussed in the theory part, in Subchapter 2.3, “in fault injection, faults 
are injected into a system which is then monitored to validate that the response matches 
the defined specifications during faulty conditions”. So, fault injection test results would 
be ambiguous if, for example, an error of wrong type was  generated in the communica-
tion link, when some other response was expected. 
Other possible consequence of an incorrect duplicate handling is if the datagram con-
tained the “start sequence”. It resets the last received datagram id in the fault injector, so 
the next datagram is definitely handled and the duplicate check for the next datagram is 
ignored.
The problem was tackled by changing the message format. The identifier for the data-
grams from Robot Framework test library to fault injector was made time-based to con-
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tain a unique identifier which depends on the milliseconds elapsed, a timestamp. Thus, 
when receiving a datagram, checking the timestamp is used to detect late datagrams; a 
new datagram must have a larger timestamp value than the previously received data-
gram. Otherwise it is a duplicate if the identifier is the same, or a late datagram, if the 
identifier was smaller.
The new identifier  is  a ten-character  hexadecimal  number in  string format.  This  in-
creases the length of a datagram but is not considered a problem because there is relat-
ively little data travelling in the Ethernet link. 
The identifier is generated by calculating the number of milliseconds elapsed from an 
epoch, the noon on the 29th of August 2019. Thus, the maximum value being ffffffffff in 
hexadecimal is 240 - 1 milliseconds from the epoch. This occurs on the 1st of January 
2054, which should be enough. The accuracy of the timestamp is one millisecond which 
is  enough. When executing a test  sequence with Robot Framework, the consecutive 
calls to the fault injection keywords take at least tens of milliseconds because of the 
time to execute a single Python function. Thus, there will not be a collision of two dif-
ferent datagrams sent with the same timestamp. Unique timestamps are even ensured by 
adding a small,  few-millisecond delay before the timestamp is generated. It does in-
crease the execution time of a keyword but is relatively small, given that the execution 
of a keyword can take even a hundred milliseconds.
Another alternative for the timestamp is to use a dynamic epoch, so that it is reset e.g. at 
the midnight.  This decreases notably the length of the timestamp. However, this ap-
proach requires synchronisation of timestamps. It can be done programmatically by con-
figuring a clock (the current time) in the processing system of the SoC-FPGA so that the 
receiving end is aware when the reset of the epoch occurs. Alternatively, it can be done 
manually, by resetting (powering off and on) the SoC-FPGA fault injector so the last 
timestamp value is reset at start-up. The former needs that the time in the clocks of the 
RF test library and the SoC-FPGA are the same, so some sort of “clock synchronisation 
procedure” should be introduced which adds to the complexity of the system. The latter 
(resetting the device) seems a cumbersome solution and would not be suitable if the sys-
tem is used in automatic testing. Thus, a fixed-epoch timestamp is used.
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For the datagrams leaving from the SoC-FPGA fault injector to Robot Framework test 
library, the identifier is also a 10-character long hexadecimal string, but the value is in-
cremented by one after each sent datagram. Furthermore, the “start sequence” datagram 
was abandoned, because if it arrives late, there was no chance to detect if it was correct.  
This makes the time-based identifier for the incoming datagrams to the fault injector the 
most suitable. 
Because the last received identifier in Robot Framework test library is reset for each test 
execution,  the datagrams coming from the fault  injector  don’t need to have such an 
identifier; the first received datagram in a test sequence is always accepted. This makes 
implementation easier. However, the identifier must always be increased between con-
secutive datagrams sent from the fault injector, too, otherwise the receiver in the RF test 
library end drops the message as a duplicate or late.
Now a datagram, that is sent from the Robot Framework test library to the fault injector 
at midnight on the 1st of September 2019 would have the format, when a CRC fault was 
requested
000cdfe600 fcrc 12345678 3 .
Here,  000cdfe600  is  the  identifier,  which  represents  the  216,000,000  milliseconds 
elapsed from the epoch in hexadecimal format. Other parameters are the same as it was 
previously described in the design phase.
5.1.2 Redesigning the setup of the fault injection library
The initial design requested, that the RF test library should have keywords for configur-
ing the IP address and port for both incoming and outgoing datagrams. These keywords 
were not implemented, because it is more convenient to set up the communication when 
the library object is initialised, and it is most likely unnecessary to change the configur-
ation while the test is already running. 
The IP and port for both directions are passed as parameters when configuring the lib-
rary in a Robot Framework test sequence, for example:
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*** Settings ***
Library FaultInjectionLibrary 192.168.1.16 4398
192.168.1.10 26000 ,
where the first two parameters, 192.168.1.16 and 4398 are the IP address and port for 
incoming datagrams, and the last two parameters, 192.168.1.10 and 26000 are the val-
ues for outgoing datagrams, i.e. the address of the fault injector device.
The constructor of the FaultInjectionLibrary class is called with those parameters. Even-
tually, it calls an initialisation function with the same parameters to set up the endpoint 
for the UDP sender object, and start listening with the UDP receiver object at the given 
endpoint. It also sends the address to the fault injector so the fault injector will transmit  
its datagrams to the correct address. Also, as seen in Algorithm 3, an additional data-
gram “ping” is sent to the fault injector after configuration; the fault injector should re-
spond with an “_ack” datagram. This process ensures that the communication is con-
figured correctly and the test itself can be run.
self.handler.setDestination(str(ipOut), int(portOut))
self.handler.setRecvEndpoint(str(ipIn), int(portIn))
self.handler.initialize()
# Send the IP of this machine to the fault injector
self.handler.send(UDPDatagram.UDPDatagram('sipa', 
[str(ipIn)]))
self.handler.send(UDPDatagram.UDPDatagram('spor', 
[str(portIn)]))
    # Erase any last received datagram first
dgram = self.handler.getLastReceived()
self.handler.send(UDPDatagram.UDPDatagram('ping'))
dgram = self._getWithTimeout() # wait max 5 secs.
if dgram is None or dgram.msgType != '_ack':
self.close_library()
raise Exception('...')
Algorithm 3. The  library  initialisation  function.  Handler  initialisation  function  will 
start to listen for incoming datagrams. With the helper function ”_get-
WithTimeout”, the call waits 5 seconds for receiving a datagram.
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5.1.3 The incomplete implementation of the AXI handler
The AXI handler is designed to be responsible of making read and write calls over the 
AXI interface to the fault injection logic IP block. The IP block in question, as already 
mentioned in this thesis, is implemented and designed independently at the company. 
However, the IP block is not ready before the thesis is finished, so the fault injector sys-
tem and the AXI handler have to be implemented without it.
The AXI handler contains the functions
int send_fault_injection(int fault_type, char* 
address_and_repeats);
int get_fault_injection_ack(int fault_type);
void set_link_type(int link_type);
void get_fault_injection_version(char* buffer);,
where  “send_fault_injection”  and  “set_link_type”  functions  should  execute  an  AXI 
write operation and the other two a read operation. However, because of missing spe-
cifications – i.a. on the interface of the injection logic block and the AXI version that is 
used – the AXI call is not made, but a placeholder for the AXI call is written as a com-
ment so that the code can be extended when the required IP block is ready.  For example
void set_link_type(int link_type) {
/* TODO: AXI write to set the link type */
}
is an AXI handler function to set the communication link type. It contains a comment in 
the code where the actual AXI write function call should be inserted. Furthermore, be-
cause the block is not ready, it cannot be configured for the programmable logic; a task 
that would have been included in the implementation part of this thesis. AXI handler 
implementation is discussed more in detail in Subchapter 5.3.
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5.2 Implementation of the Robot Framework test library
The  Robot  Framework  test  library  is  implemented  with  Python  programming  lan-
guage’s version 3.6.8 for Robot Frameworks version 3.1.1. The test library contains five 
files: UDPDatagram.py, UDPSender.py, UDPReceiver.py, UDPHandler.py and Fault-
InjectionLibrary.py. Each file represents a single Python module which means that the 
code in one file can be used, i.e. imported, in another module. This allows modularisa-
tion of the logic, so that code that is relative for a specific task is located in a single 
module, a file, and not scattered in pieces between the files. This helps maintaining and 
further development. The hierarchy between the Python files is depicted in Figure 27.
Figure 27. The modules (files) in the Robot Framework test library and the relationship 
between them. Robot Framework accesses the codebase with the test library 
module, FaultInjectionLibrary.py, by loading it at the beginning of a test.
As it was designed, UDPDatagram.py contains a class representation of a single data-
gram. The interface (declarations of the functions and the class) is given in Algorithm 4.
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class UDPDatagram:
    # Initializes id, messageType and parameters  
    def __init__(self, messageType = '', parameters = []):
        # -- Lines removed --
    # Validates that the datagram is correct
    def validate(self):
        # -- Lines removed --
    # This converts this UDP datagram object into a string
    def getString(self):
        # -- Lines removed --
# Creates a datagram object from the contents (a string)
def creteDatagram(contentString):
    # -- Lines removed --
Algorithm 4. Function declarations of the UDPDatagram.py module.
As shown in Algorithm 4, three additional functions were added to this module. After a 
datagram is created and its identifier,  message type and parameters are changed, the 
module that uses the datagram should call “validate” function on the object before pro-
ceeding further. This function verifiers that the type is one of the allowed types and the 
identifier as well as the parameters are in allowed range. If any criteria is not fulfilled, 
an exception is raised so the caller of the validate function is informed.
The second of the additional functions in this module are “getString” which converts a 
datagram object to a string representation so it is serialised and can be encoded into 
bytes before sending. The last, the third additional function is “createDatagram” which 
takes a string representation of a datagram and converts it to a UDPDatagram object. 
Before returning the object instance, it also calls the previously described validate func-
tion.
The file UDPSender.py is a module that contains a UDPSender class that is responsible 
for sending datagrams. Its declaration is shown in Algorithm 5.
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class UDPSender:
    # The datagram identifier is created 
    # with the milliseconds elapsed from the EPOCH
    # Epoch on 29th of August 2019 12:00 (24h clock)
    EPOCH = datetime(2019, 8, 29, 12, 0, 0)
    # Initialise values and create a sending socket
    def __init__(self):
        # -- Lines removed --
    # Close the sending socket
    def close(self):
        # -- Lines removed --
    
    # Get the identifier (as integer) for the datagram
    def getIdentifier(self):
        # -- Lines removed --
    # Send a datagram
    def send(self, datagram):
        # -- Lines removed –
Algorithm 5. Function declaration of the UDPSender.py module.
It is implemented as designed, except the identifier has to match the new specification. 
Before sending a datagram, the “getIdentifier” function is called, which calculates the 
number of milliseconds elapsed from the epoch. The epoch is defined as a class variable 
called “EPOCH”, as shown in the previous code in Algorithm 5.
When sending, the UDPSender creates a UDPDatagram object and gets its string repres-
entation  with  “getString”  of  that  class.  That  function  does  the  conversion  for  the 
timestamp identifier, which is in integer format into a 10-digit hexadecimal format.
The sending socket  is  created in the constructor  of the class (in  Python it  is  called 
“__init__”). To free any resources in the system, the UDPSender class has an additional 
“close” function which closes the UDP socket. It should always be called at the end of 
the program.
UDPReceiver.py contains the UDPReceiver class that listens for incoming datagrams 
and handles them. The declaration of this class is given in Algorithm 6. 
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class UDPReceiver:
    def __init__(self):
        # -- Lines removed --
    # Start listening the datagrams in a separate thread.
    # This should be called in UDP Handler's initialize 
function.
    def startListening(self, address = None, port = None):
        # -- Lines removed --
    # Listen indefinitely for incoming datagrams
    def listenEndlessly(self):
        # -- Lines removed --
    # Handle the datagram: validate and ignore duplicates
    def handle(self, data, addr):
        # -- Lines removed --
    # This closes the receiver when test quits or the ad-
dress is changed
    def close(self, socketEndpoint = None):
        # -- Lines removed –
Algorithm 6. Declaration of the functions in UDPReceiver.py module.
In the design phase, it was planned that there should be a boolean variable that indicates 
when the socket should be closed. This is designed for the case when the address for in-
coming datagrams would be changed, so the previous socket and thread must be closed 
before a new one can be opened.
Instead, the closing and re-opening process is done by sending a special datagram. This 
is because the function “recvfrom” in Python’s socket library blocks the execution of 
the code until a datagram is received. So, when a new thread should be started, the re-
ceiver creates a sending UDP socket which sends a “DATAGRAM_RECV_STOP” da-
tagram to the receiving socket as shown in Algorithm 7. 
if self.sock is not None:
    # Socket is closed by sending a stop command to it
    s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
    for _ in range(3): # Send 3 times
        s.sendto('DATAGRAM_RECV_STOP'.encode(), ep)
    s.close()
Algorithm 7. Inside the close function, a special stop datagram is sent with a tempor-
ary socket ”s” to the receiving socket (its address is defined with ”ep”).
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The receiving socket listens for this message and closes itself and the thread stops if 
such message was received.
Furthermore, because of the redesigned datagram identifier specification, any received 
datagram is ignored and dropped not only if the identifier is the same than the previous 
one  but  also  if  the  value  is  smaller  than  the  previous.  Also,  similarly  with  the 
UDPSender class, the receiver contains a simple “close” function that executes the pre-
viously described closing process, so the socket is freed and the listening thread finishes 
when the program quits.
UDPHandler.py file contains the UDPHandler class. As it was designed, it is only an in-
terface  for  the  Robot  Framework  test  library.  It  has  one  additional  function  called 
“cleanUp”. It closes the sockets of the sender and receiver with the respective “close” 
functions of those two classes.
FaultInjectionLibrary.py is the file that contains the test library class which will be im-
ported by Robot Framework when a test is executed. The declaration of all the functions 
in this class is shown in Algorithm 8.
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class FaultInjectionLibrary(object):
    # Only one instance is created for the test execution
    ROBOT_LIBRARY_SCOPE = 'GLOBAL'
    def __init__(self, ipIn = RECV_IP, portIn = RECV_PORT, 
ipOut = ZYNQ_IP, portOut = ZYNQ_PORT):
    def _initializeLibrary(self, ipIn, portIn, ipOut, 
portOut):
    # General method to send a fault injection command with 
UDP and receive an acknowledgement
    def _injectFault(self, faultType, address, count):
    # Get the received datagram but with a 5 sec timeout
    def _getWithTimeout(self):
    # The keywords that are available in the library:
    def close_library(self):
    def inject_CRC_fault(self, address, count):
    def inject_address_change_fault(self, address, count):
    def inject_length_change_fault(self, address, count):
    def inject_duplicate_message_fault(self, address, 
count):
    def inject_drop_message_fault(self, address, count):
    def get_fault_injection_version(self):
    def set_communication_link_type(self, linkType):
Algorithm 8. Function declarations in the FaultInjectionLibrary class. For simplicity, 
function bodies are removed without explicitly telling so.
FaultInjectionLibrary is initialised as it was discussed in Subchapter 5.1.2 and shown in 
Algorithm 3. The library has also a “close_library” function, which eventually calls the 
cleanup function from the UDPHandler. Thus, all the reserved resources (sockets and 
threads) are finished and closed when the function is called. Hence, this keyword must 
be called at the tear down of a test.
All the functions in the class are available as Robot Framework keywords in the test se-
quence,  unless  they  start  with  an  underscore  (_).  Because  all  the  fault  injection 
keywords have the same logic – except the fault type – the common logic is included in 
“_injectFault” function, which takes the fault type, the address and the number of re-
peats as parameter. As designed, it injects the selected fault by sending a fault injection 
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request with UDP to the fault injector and waits for the acknowledgement. Then, for ex-
ample the definition of the function “inject_crc_fault” can be simplified into
def inject_CRC_fault(self, address, count):
    self._injectFault('fcrc', address, count).
Also, there is additional helper function called “_getWithTimeout”. This is used e.g. in 
the previous fault injection function to get the acknowledgement of the fault injection. 
This function gets the last received datagram from the UDPReceiver with a timeout; if 
there wasn’t any datagram received in a timeout of 5 seconds, an empty value “None” is 
returned to indicate that the timeout was reached.
Furthermore, the FaultInjectionLibrary class contains a class member definition
ROBOT_LIBRARY_SCOPE = 'GLOBAL',
which is a built-in feature of Robot Framework. When the value of this variable is set to 
“GLOBAL”, Robot Framework knows that it should only create one single instance of 
this test library during the whole test execution. If this was not defined, or if it had a dif-
ferent value, Robot Framework would create a new instance of the test library for each 
test. This would initialise the test library and create a new listening socket for each test 
inside the test suite, which is unwanted behaviour.
5.3 Implementation of the SoC-FPGA fault injector
The fault injector is implemented by programming the processing system with C lan-
guage. The project template for the Xilinx SDK (software development kit) and FPGA 
configuration tool is generated automatically by a script. It includes the needed config-
uration to first program the programmable logic (FPGA) and it generates the necessary 
files to program the processing system. In addition to the automatically generated files, 
it has three custom made files; main.c, udp_server.c and axi_manager.c. The latter two 
have also header files called udp_server.h and axi_manager.h.
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The file main.c does the initialisation of the UDP PCBs (protocol control blocks) and 
the networking for incoming datagrams and calls for a function in udp_server.c to start 
listening for incoming datagrams. The initialisation logic code is modified from an ex-
ample UDP code provided by Xilinx.
The file udp_server.c contains the designed UDP server. The header file contains the 
function declarations:
void set_fwd_addr(char* ip_addr, int port);
void receive_datagram(void *arg, struct udp_pcb *pcb, struct 
pbuf *p, struct ip_addr *addr, u16_t port);
int validate_datagram(const char* datagram, long long* id, 
char* msg_type_buffer, char* parameters_buffer);
int check_duplicate(long long* id, const char* 
message_type);
void execute_action(const char* message_type, char* 
parameters);
void send_data(char data[]);.
It sets up the PCB for outgoing UDP datagrams with “set_fwd_addr” and executes a 
function called “receive_datagram” when a new datagram is  received.  This function 
then calls validation and duplicate detection functions to verify that the received data-
gram is valid before calling “execute_action” function. This is the function that finally 
executes an action, depending on the message type. For example, it can send a fault in-
jection request and getting the acknowledgement from the AXI handler or change the 
forwarding address again.lar
If the action required sending a response datagram back to Robot Framework, it is sent 
by calling “send_data” function. This function adds a proper identifier to the datagram 
and sends it three times to the configured upstream endpoint. The contents for the data-
gram are passed as a plain string because unlike the datagrams sent from Robot Frame-
work,  they  are  very  simple  by  structure,  and  thus  no  special  structure  handling  is 
needed.
AXI handler is implemented in axi_manager.c. As stated, it cannot contain much logic, 
since the specification of the AXI interface to the fault injection logic is not provided.
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For testing purposes, “get_fault_injection_version” function returns a dummy fault in-
jection version “0.1” and “get_fault_injection_ack” returns 1 which is code for a suc-
cessful operation.
Sending fault injection is done in “send_fault_injection” function. For it, the target ad-
dress of the fault and the repeat count are passed in a single string, where the two are 
separated by a space character. Splitting and converting the two into separate variables 
is done inside the function. If the repeat count was not numeric or if one of the two were 
missing, the function returns ‘0’ which incidates an unsuccessful operation. Otherwise, 
‘1’ is returned. Other functions do not do validation of input data of any kind.
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6 TESTING THE FAULT INJECTOR SYSTEM
In this chapter, the fault injector is tested. In the initial plan, it was supposed that the 
fault injector has the fault injection logic block available and it is connected to the com-
munication link. The injected faults would have been seen in the communication link by 
reading statistics and other data and the fault detection and correction for the injected 
faults could have been reflected with the theory given in Chapter 2.
However, because the fault injection logic block is not available yet, the nature of the 
testing phase changes. It concentrates on testing the UDP/IP communication and the 
Robot Framework test library.
6.1 Designing the tests
All the tests are done by executing Robot Framework test files that use the implemented 
RF test library to send and receive datagrams. All the test files are based on the follow-
ing test file template
*** Settings ***
Library FaultInjectionLibrary  [ad1] [p1] [ad2] [p2]
Suite Teardown Close Library
*** Test Cases ***
First test
    # Test keywords here
Nth test
    # More keyword calls here,
which shows how to initialise the fault injection library, and how to close it after the test 
suite (the collection of multiple tests) is completed, whether it was successful or not. As 
already discussed, the Library keyword initialises a library (FaultInjectionLibrary) with 
given parameters. The parameters for our library are the endpoint values (address and 
port) for incoming datagrams and for outgoing datagrams, in this order.
When the test is designed, the test file can be saved and run by Robot Framework with
python -m robot test_file.robot,
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assuming that Python 3 is installed with Robot Framework and available with “python” 
command, and the test file is called “test_file.robot” in the current directory.
After the test is run, Robot Framework generates three files. Summary of all the test ex-
ecuted in the test suite is in “result.html” HTML file. The details of the tests are in a 
HTML log file “log.html” which contains all the steps of the tests and the same data in a 
more machine readable XML format in a file “output.xml”. For the tests here, log.html 
file is read with a web browser to show the result and details of a test. If there were any 
errors, this file also gives a description of errors. An example of how the log.html looks 
like is shown in Figure 28.
Figure 28. A partial  screenshot  from the log.html  HTML file.  It  shows information 
about a completed test suite as well as keyword-level details on the test exe-
cution.
The fault injector board also gives output of received and sent datagrams, as well as 
other data about execution. This data is also read but it has to be done manually for each 
test to validate that the fault injector functions properly. Thus, the tests should cover all 
the cases but a single test should be short enough so that there is not too much data to be 
read manually, so the output from the fault injector can easily be validated.
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Thus, the following test cases should be created and run with Robot Framework by us-
ing the given test file template:
1. Fault injection tests, which contain all the fault injection types. The fault injec-
tions  should  be  successful.  Different  parameters  (target  address  and  repeat 
count) are used.
2. Failed fault injections, which try unsuccessfully to inject a fault with a fault in-
jector by passing invalid parameters. The built-in keyword “Run keyword and 
expect error” of Robot Framework can be utilised here. The errors should caught 
by data validation in the keywords of the RF test library.
3. Timeout test, which tests that a fault injection keyword should fail if receiving 
acknowledgement lasts too long. Because the fault injector returns always an ac-
knowledgement, its code has to be tweaked for this test so that in some cases the 
fault injector does not return an ACK datagram to the RF test library.
4. Negative acknowledgement test, which tests that the fault injection fails if a 
negative acknowledgement is received from the fault injector. Like in timeout 
testing, additional code for testing purposes must be added so that negative ACK 
can be returned from the fault injector.
5. Test other functions, which are setting the communication link type and read-
ing the fault injector version. Testing with invalid values is included here, too.
6. Multiple tests, which mean that a test suite (a file) has multiple tests. This tests 
validates, that only one instance of the fault injection library is generated for all 
the tests.
7. Library initialisation, which initialises the library with invalid parameters. The 
initialisation function test for successful communication with a “ping” datagram 
to the fault injector which should fail and a test should not start.
8. All functions test, which contains a portion of each of the previous tests. Here, 
it is validated that there are no unexpected cross-effects between the functions.
All the eight tests should be successfully executed. This is validated by both reading the 
log file from Robot Framework and the output from the fault injector. If a test fails, the 
cause will be found out and needed actions are executed, either fixing a small program-
ming error or making a larger change in design, depending on the error.
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6.2 Preparing the testing
The SoC-FPGA fault injection board is powered up and connected to the PC. It has 
three connections to the PC as shown in Figure 29. The JTAG (joint test action group) 
port is connected with a USB adapter to the computer which allows programming the 
board. An Ethernet cable is connected to the corresponding ports in both PC and the 
board and it is used for the UDP/IP communication between the two. Furthermore, a 
second cable is connected to the PC with a USB adapter and it uses a serial protocol to 
send e.g. the output of the print statements from the board to the PC. This output can be 
read by using Minicom serial communications program on the PC, as depicted in Fig-
ure 30.
Figure 29. The fault injector SoC-FPGA board with a JTAG USB cable, a serial cable 
and an Ethernet cable connected to it.
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Figure 30. A screenshot from Ubuntu terminal that is running Minicom. At the top, 
there is configuration information and help in Finnish followed by the actual 
output from the fault injector.
After setting up the fault injector board, the FPGA on it is programmed by Xilinx SDK. 
After programming the FPGA, the software for the fault injector is programmed on the 
processing system of the SoC-FPGA and run. Finally, a static IP address is assigned on 
the PC so that the communication over Ethernet to the fault injector is possible. The 
fault injector is ready for testing.
Because the fault injection logic block is not yet available, testing timeout and negative 
acknowledgements are not possible as such. To be able to test them, the source code in 
fault injector is changed a little. A piece of code shown in Algorithm 9 is injected in a 
proper  place  for  testing  purposes  in  “execute_action”  function  in  the  fault  injector. 
Thus, if the address for a fault injection is a string “timeout” and repeat count is 1, no 
acknowledgement is sent. Additionally, if the address is “negative_ack” and the count is 
1,  a  negative  acknowledgement  is  sent.  The keyword call  in  Robot Framework test 
should fail in this case.
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    // Simulates that no ACK is sent
    if (!strcmp(parameters, "timeout 1")) {
            return;
    }
    // Simulates a negative acknowledgement from the AXI
if (!strcmp(parameters, "negative_ack 1")) {
send_data("_nak");
return;
   }
Algorithm 9. Fault injection process is stopped with return before sending an ACK if 
the  parameter  string  matches  with  ”timeout  1”.  Furthermore,  it  is 
stopped and a negative acknowledgement (_nak) is sent if the parameter 
string is ”negative_ack 1”.
The test files are then created. The contents of the files are included in the Subchapter  
6.3 together with the test log and fault injector output.
6.3 Running the tests
The test are run by launching a test from the command line. After the test has run, the  
fault  injector output is read in Minicom window and validated to match the test  se-
quence. Also, the Robot Framework log file is used to validate a successfully executed 
test.
In Algorithm 10, there is an example of one of the tests, the first test called “fault injec-
tion tests”. Setup and tear down of the library are omitted here at the beginning of the 
file.
Fault Injection Tests
Inject CRC Fault abcdffff 5
Inject Address Change Fault 12345678 2
Inject Length Change Fault abcdef01 100
Inject Duplicate Message Fault abcdef01 1
Inject Drop Message Fault 50000aaa 1000
Algorithm 10. Example of a fault inject test sequence in the tests.
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The output is collected from the fault injector. Example of the output from the execution 
of the previously given “fault injection tests” test sequence is
<-- "0007034d02 fcrc abcdffff 5"
Injecting fault 
"0000000001 _ack" --> 192.168.1.16:4398
<-- "0007034d69 fadr 12345678 2"
Injecting fault 
"0000000002 _ack" --> 192.168.1.16:4398
<-- "0007034dd0 flen abcdef01 100"
Injecting fault 
"0000000003 _ack" --> 192.168.1.16:4398
<-- "0007034e38 fdup abcdef01 1"
Injecting fault 
"0000000004 _ack" --> 192.168.1.16:4398
<-- "0007034e9f fdrp 50000aaa 1000"
Injecting fault 
"0000000005 _ack" --> 192.168.1.16:4398,
where the arrows represent incoming (<--) and outgoing (-->) datagrams to and from the 
fault injector. As can be seen from the output, all the five faults are injected and an ac-
knowledgement is returned. Also, the datagram format is correct. The Robot Frame-
works log HTML file is shown in Figure 31.
Figure 31. The screenshot of the log file of the ”fault injection tests” test.
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As can be seen in Table 7, library initialisation test failed expectedly. It is because the 
execution was stopped at the first step, when an CRC fault was tried to be injected. The 
error message was “No keyword with name 'Inject CRC Fault' found”. This is because 
the library initialisation threw an error when sending the “ping” datagram to the fault in-
jector did not result in an acknowledgement response because of incorrect endpoint val-
ues typed in the initialisation of the library. Thus, the library was not initialised and the 
keywords were not available in the test sequence.
Table 7. The tests and their results.
Test name Result
Fault injection tests success
Failed fault injections success
Timeout test success
Negative acknowledgement test success
Other functions success
Test with multiple tests success
Library initialisation failed (expectedly)
Test all functions success
6.4 Summary and analysis of the test results
As can be seen in Table 7, all the tests were executed successfully. In addition, when 
validating the fault injector output files, it was seen that there were no errors in the com-
munication. From these, it can be concluded that the error generator system works ex-
pectedly.
Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, the fault injection logic block was not available dur-
ing the tests. This means that only the UDP/IP communication and the Robot Frame-
work test library were tested. Also, as it was noted in the test of “Library initialisation”, 
the test failed and stopped at the first test step and not in the initialisation process. Stop-
ping the test could be done earlier, before the first step, if Robot Framework supports it.
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
In this thesis, a fault-injecting device and a test library for an error generator system is 
created. They are used to inject faults into a serial communication link to test the error 
handling of the link. The created device will be used as a part of Danfoss test automa-
tion system.  The objective consists of designing and implementing a SoC-FPGA fault 
injector that can communicate with a Robot Framework test library over Ethernet and 
with the actual fault injection logic on the FPGA, too.  Furthermore, the objective in-
cludes designing and implementing the Robot Framework test library which is used to 
produce targeted and automatic fault injection tests for a communication link.
From the remarks made during the thesis as well as analysing the test results, the fol-
lowing conclusions are made:
• Working principles of error detection and handling in a serial communication 
links were studied.
• A system with the given specifications was designed and implemented.
• The system was tested without the missing fault injector block from the supplier 
and it was found out that the system worked expectedly.
• It will be possible to create and run customisable fault injection tests on a com-
munication link after the missing component is added and configured to the sys-
tem.
As stated in the thesis, the system cannot be tested as a whole because the fault injection 
block is not yet implemented. Thus the objective of this thesis is reduced. Some of the 
other remarks are not discussed in full detail in the work, but postponed for later devel-
opment and further research. These include
• adding the fault injection logic block into the system, 
• testing the system on a real communication link,
• a more detailed study on the advantages and disadvantages  of using a UDP-
based communication instead of TCP and
• implementing the UDP protocol with binary messages instead of plain-text and 
studying the advantages of that improvement.
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8 SUMMARY
This thesis is made for Danfoss Drives that manufactures frequency converters. In fre-
quency converters, avoiding errors in transferred data is critical, which is why an error 
generator system is created in this thesis to test the reliability of the communication in 
for example a frequency converter.
The fault injection logic block is aimed to be included in the SoC-FPGA fault injector 
that was created in this thesis. The logic block in question is a circuit that actually does 
injecting  the  faults  into  a  communication  link.  However,  the  block  is  not  designed 
within this thesis but by the Danfoss. For this, fault detection and correction techniques 
in serial communication protocols are studied. This information is useful when eventu-
ally running the fault injection tests when the fault injector is connected into a serial 
communication link.
However, the thesis has a limited timespan where it should be carried out. The logic 
block in question could not yet be delivered for the thesis within that time so it had to be 
left out. This means that most of the theory chapter has information that could not be 
utilised in the reflection and analysis of the test results. However, after studying serial 
communication protocols, to help the next phases, the design and implementation, the 
reader was acquainted with SoC-FPGAs, Robot Framework and UDP.
The design and the implementation phases are carried out by separating the error gener-
ator system into three main parts;  the UDP communication between the SoC-FPGA 
fault injector and the PC that runs Robot Framework, the RF test library that provides 
functions to execute fault injection tests and the logic for the programmable system of 
the fault injector. 
After this phase, the functionality is tested by designing and running tests for each func-
tionality. Unlike it was thought at the start of the thesis, the system could not be tested 
with a real communication link where faults would have been injected. Thus, testing 
was done only for the ready components. The test results indicated that the implemented 
components work as expected and they fulfil the requirements.
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From the design and implementation part, the main conclusion is that the work on the 
UDP communication took most of the time. Missing datagrams and datagrams arriving 
in a scrambled order caused trouble when designing the communication. Despite study-
ing the UDP protocol in the theory phase, the flow control of the communication was 
not designed robust enough. Because of this, some iterative design had to be done when 
flaws in the design were found only when already entering the implementation phase.
In the future,  the UDP communication could be replaced by a TCP communication. 
UDP is by default faster and lighter than TCP. Thus, it could be compared if any ad-
vantage can be achieved when using one over the other. This study can be interesting, 
because,  to  increase robustness,  additional  flow control  with identifiers  and sending 
multiple packets had to be implemented on top of the UDP which increased its band-
width usage – however, TCP does this automatically.
Most importantly, the fault injection logic block should be connected into the fault in-
jector device to actually inject faults. This allows testing the whole system and can re-
veal problems in the implementation or in the design. 
In the design phase, it was assumed that the block will be ready and connected to the 
system, so the design was made a complete system in mind. Only in the implementation 
the respective parts had to be left out. In the best case, the block has just to be con-
figured in the system and a few lines of code to be inserted in the code base of the fault 
injector to get the complete system working. Thus, finalising the error generator system, 
testing the complete system and analysing the test results by reflecting them to the the-
ory part of this thesis is the most likely relevant way to expand the work and do further 
research.
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